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Coordinated	  Exploration:	  
Organizing	  Search	  by	  Multiple	  Specialists	  to	  Overcome	  Mutual	  Confusion	  and	  
Joint	  Myopia	  	  	  
Abstract	  
	  The	   coordination	   of	   specialists’	   search	   efforts	   is	   one	   of	   the	   principal	   purposes	   of	  organization.	   Integration	  mechanisms	   enable	   joint	   search	  by	   allowing	   interdependent	  others	   to	   form	   shared	   mental	   models	   of	   the	   joint	   task.	   Whereas	   prior	   theory	   has	  concentrated	   on	   how	   integration	   mechanisms	   impact	   coordination	   among	   multiple	  specialists,	   they	  have	  not	   explored	  how	   integration	   impacts	   search.	  We	   call	   problems	  that	  emphasize	  both	  search	  and	  coordination	  as	  “problems	  of	  coordinated	  exploration”.	  Using	  a	  computational	  model,	  we	  find	  that	  coordinated	  exploration	  is	  not	  simple	  scaling	  up	  of	   individual	  search.	  Coordinated	  exploration	   is	  subject	   to	   two	  problems	  –	  mutual-­‐
confusion	  and	  joint-­‐myopia	  –	  that	  arise	  only	  when	  epistemic	  interdependence	  is	  coupled	  with	  uncertainty.	  Agents’	  attempts	  to	  reduce	  mutual-­‐confusion	  automatically	  increases	  joint-­‐myopia	   and	  vice-­‐versa.	  Organizing	   coordinated	   exploration	   requires	   that	   agents’	  mental	  model	  alignment	  balances	  the	  need	  for	  both	  coordination	  and	  search	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  these	  two	  pathologies	  in	  joint	  search.	  	  
Key	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  New	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INTRODUCTION	  Models	  of	  search	  and	  learning	  are	  foundational	  to	  the	  behavioral	  theory	  of	  organizations	  (March	  and	  Simon,	  1958).	  Typical	  models	  of	  organizational	  search	  consider	  firms	  to	  be	  unitary	  actors	  whose	  behavior	  is	  constrained	  by	  cognitive	  limitations	  (Cyert	  and	  March,	  1963;	  Nelson	  and	  Winter,	  1982).	  Their	  objective	  is	  to	  identify	  tall	  peaks	  on	  a	  search	  landscape	  by	  balancing	  exploration	  and	  exploitation	  (Levinthal,	  1997;	  Ethiraj	  and	  Levinthal,	  2004;	  Siggelkow	  and	  Levinthal,	  2003).	  The	  unitary	  actor	  assumption	  is	  a	  useful	  abstraction	  and	  baseline	  that	  has	  facilitated	  a	  thorough	  examination	  of	  problems	  related	  to	  balancing	  exploration	  and	  exploitation	  and	  identified	  organizational	  mechanisms	  that	  can	  facilitate	  such	  search.	  	  However	  such	  models	  abstract	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  organizational	  search	  in	  many	  cases	  involves	  coordinated	  exploration,	  where	  search	  is	  undertaken	  by	  multiple	  actors	  who	  need	  to	  coordinate	  their	  efforts.	  Many	  problems	  solved	  by	  firms	  involve	  joint	  effort	  by	  multiple	  domain	  experts	  (specialists).	  Interdependence	  between	  specialists	  implies	  the	  need	  for	  coordinating	  their	  search	  efforts.	  Whereas	  each	  specialist	  is	  responsible	  for	  search	  in	  their	  own	  domain,	  their	  payoffs	  are	  dependent	  on	  the	  choices	  of	  other	  specialists.	  In	  traditional	  game	  theory,	  interdependent	  actors	  know	  all	  their	  choices,	  the	  choices	  available	  to	  others,	  and	  all	  joint	  payoffs.	  Boundedly	  rational	  actors,	  however,	  neither	  know	  all	  the	  available	  choices	  in	  the	  relevant	  domains,	  nor	  their	  payoffs.	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  choices	  of	  each	  can	  influence	  their	  joint	  outcomes	  in	  ways	  that	  neither	  anticipates	  nor	  fully	  understands.	  This	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  coordinated	  
exploration.	  Models	  of	  search	  performed	  by	  unitary	  actors	  ignore	  coordination	  that	  is	  fundamental	  to	  a	  theory	  of	  search	  involving	  multiple	  actors,	  and	  therefore	  offers	  few	  insights	  into	  problems	  of	  coordinated	  exploration.	  In	  this	  paper	  we	  aim	  to	  understand	  how	  organizations	  solve	  such	  problems.	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Problems	  of	  coordinated	  exploration	  are	  ubiquitous	  in	  organizations	  because	  division	  of	  labor	  is	  one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  reasons	  to	  organize.	  As	  soon	  as	  the	  environment	  becomes	  too	  complex	  for	  a	  single	  individual	  to	  comprehend,	  organizations	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  economies	  of	  specialization	  offered	  by	  the	  division	  of	  labor.	  However,	  division	  of	  labor	  is	  accompanied	  by	  the	  need	  for	  integration.	  Typically,	  organizations	  rely	  on	  differentiation	  and	  then	  integration	  to	  straddle	  this	  trade-­‐off	  (Lawrence	  and	  Lorsch,	  1967).	  In	  these	  cases,	  experts	  or	  specialized	  organizational	  units	  search	  in	  individual	  domains,	  the	  results	  of	  which	  are	  then	  integrated	  into	  a	  joint	  solution	  with	  an	  observable	  payoff.	  Coordinated	  exploration	  therefore	  involves	  solving	  two	  interdependent	  problems:	  1)	  search:	  the	  specialist	  problem	  of	  searching	  for	  new	  valuable	  alternatives	  in	  a	  particular	  domain,	  and	  2)	  coordination:	  the	  problem	  of	  choosing	  an	  alternative	  from	  a	  particular	  domain	  such	  that	  it	  is	  jointly	  attractive	  to	  all	  agents,	  though	  it	  may	  not	  be	  optimal	  for	  any	  one	  of	  them.	  	  As	  our	  canonical	  example,	  we	  adopt	  New	  Product	  Development	  (NPD)	  within	  firms,	  which	  typically	  involve	  multiple	  specialists	  working	  together.	  To	  make	  the	  rather	  abstract	  idea	  of	  coordinated	  exploration	  more	  concrete,	  consider	  the	  problem	  of	  designing	  windmills.	  Rotor	  blade	  design	  is	  critical	  for	  the	  efficiency	  of	  a	  windmill.	  Blade	  design	  involves	  finding	  the	  right	  combination	  of	  structural	  and	  aerodynamic	  characteristics	  to	  achieve	  desired	  performance.	  Structural	  properties	  enable	  blades	  to	  withstand	  adverse	  weather	  conditions.	  Good	  aerodynamics	  is	  critical	  for	  efficiently	  converting	  wind	  energy	  to	  power.	  In	  general,	  light	  curved	  blades	  have	  good	  aerodynamics,	  but	  poor	  strength.	  This	  innovative	  search	  problem	  is	  jointly	  solved	  by	  two	  specialists:	  a	  structural	  mechanics	  engineer	  and	  an	  aerodynamics	  engineer,	  who	  have	  little	  knowledge	  of	  each	  other’s	  domains.	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Product	  positioning	  is	  another	  example	  of	  coordinated	  exploration	  –	  marketing	  experts	  typically	  explore	  the	  domain	  “who	  should	  be	  the	  customer,”	  portioning	  a	  market	  into	  segments	  that	  respond	  in	  homogenous	  ways	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  marketing	  mix	  (product,	  price,	  promotion,	  and	  place).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  product	  experts	  explore	  the	  domain	  “what	  can	  we	  offer	  customers,”	  devising	  product	  or	  service	  offerings	  that	  deliver	  different	  cost/feature	  combinations.	  A	  value	  proposition	  lies	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  these	  choices,	  and	  needs	  to	  be	  discovered	  jointly	  by	  the	  two	  departments.	  	  Many	  organizational	  problems	  display	  the	  properties	  of	  coordinated	  exploration,	  including	  these:	  coordinating	  input	  from	  legal	  experts	  and	  the	  HR-­‐department	  in	  location	  decisions,	  coordinating	  response	  by	  business	  units	  that	  operate	  in	  different	  markets,	  or	  managing	  inter-­‐agency	  communication	  during	  disaster	  situations.	  In	  these	  problems,	  the	  essential	  feature	  is	  that	  their	  solutions	  involve	  more	  than	  one	  actor,	  each	  searching	  in	  a	  different	  aspect	  of	  the	  problem	  space,	  and	  their	  separate	  decisions	  are	  integrated	  to	  generate	  a	  joint	  payoff	  matrix	  that	  the	  actors	  do	  not	  know	  and	  cannot	  conceive	  in	  advance.	  	  Prior	  work	  in	  organization	  theory	  has	  implicitly	  assumed	  that	  results	  from	  individual	  search	  models	  can	  be	  generalized	  to	  problems	  of	  coordinated	  exploration.	  However,	  when	  multiple	  agents	  are	  engaged	  in	  coordinated	  exploration,	  it	  is	  a	  case	  of	  
epistemic	  interdependence,	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  one	  agent’s	  optimal	  choices	  depend	  upon	  accurately	  predicting	  another	  agent’s	  actions	  (Puranam,	  Raveendran	  and	  Knudsen,	  2012).	  It	  is	  well	  known	  that	  communication,	  or	  more	  generally	  shared	  knowledge	  is	  necessary	  to	  coordinate	  epistemic	  interdependence,	  which	  has	  led	  prior	  theory	  to	  suggest	  that	  coordinated	  exploration	  is	  nothing	  but	  individual	  search	  coupled	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  communication	  between	  the	  agents	  (Tushman	  and	  Nadler,	  1978).	  However,	  empirical	  work	  suggests	  that	  a	  high	  level	  of	  communication	  between	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specialists	  is	  not	  reliably	  associated	  with	  good	  outcomes	  (Brown	  and	  Eisenhardt,	  1995;	  Sine	  et	  al,	  2007;	  Montoya-­‐Weiss	  and	  Calantone,	  1994).	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  currently	  unclear	  how	  epistemic	  interdependence	  influences	  boundedly	  rational	  organizational	  search.	  	  	  In	  this	  paper	  we	  investigate	  how	  to	  organize	  coordinated	  exploration	  using	  an	  agent	  based	  model.	  We	  find	  that	  conclusions	  from	  unitary	  searcher	  models	  do	  not	  fit	  coordinated	  exploration;	  coordinated	  exploration,	  depending	  on	  how	  it	  is	  organized,	  can	  outperform	  or	  underperform	  search	  by	  a	  single	  agent.	  Specifically,	  coordinated	  exploration	  is	  subject	  to	  two	  pathologies	  that	  are	  not	  present	  in	  unitary	  search.	  	  Joint	  search	  involves	  a	  situation	  where	  feedback	  to	  one	  agent’s	  actions	  is	  confounded	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  other	  agent.	  Search	  therefore	  leads	  to	  increasing	  
mutual-­‐confusion	  where	  agents	  are	  unable	  to	  learn	  from	  feedback	  to	  correct	  their	  faulty	  mental	  models	  of	  the	  search	  space.	  Incorrect	  mental	  models	  held	  by	  one	  agent	  leads	  to	  mistakes,	  which	  in	  turn	  confuse	  the	  other	  agent	  (perturb	  their	  mental	  model)	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Sharing	  knowledge	  aligns	  mental	  models	  and	  counters	  mutual-­‐confusion	  by	  inducing	  coordination	  around	  particular	  search	  regions.	  However,	  that	  very	  effort	  increases	  
joint-­‐myopia	  in	  search,	  a	  situation	  where	  agents	  mutually	  reinforce	  each	  other	  into	  an	  increasingly	  narrow	  portion	  of	  the	  search	  space	  prematurely.	  In	  the	  extreme,	  high	  levels	  of	  shared	  knowledge	  induces	  agents	  to	  abandon	  their	  distinct	  search	  approach	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  lower	  common	  denominator.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  coordinated	  exploration,	  increasing	  coordination	  effort	  
reduces	  mutual	  confusion,	  but	  simultaneously	  increases	  joint	  myopia;	  efforts	  to	  reduce	  
joint	  myopia	  automatically	  increase	  mutual	  confusion.	  Successful	  joint	  search	  needs	  to	  balance	  these	  two	  effects.	  Our	  results	  suggest	  that	  because	  unitary	  searcher	  models	  abstract	  from	  epistemic	  interdependence,	  their	  predictions	  are	  potentially	  misleading	  in	  the	  context	  of	  coordinated	  exploration.	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PRIOR	  WORK	  ON	  ORGANIZING	  FOR	  COORDINATED	  EXPLORATION	  How	  to	  effectively	  manage	  the	  specialization-­‐coordination	  trade-­‐off	  has	  engaged	  organization	  scholars	  for	  over	  fifty	  years,	  if	  not	  longer.	  March	  and	  Simon	  (1958)	  suggested	  that	  organizations	  achieve	  coordination	  by	  two	  generic	  means:	  plan	  and	  feedback.	  When	  interdependence	  is	  stable	  and	  predictable,	  plan-­‐based	  coordination	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  standard	  operating	  procedures,	  rules	  and	  routines	  are	  effective	  and	  efficient.	  However,	  when	  the	  nature	  of	  interdependence	  is	  unknown	  or	  unstable,	  coordination	  is	  achieved	  by	  feedback.	  Thompson	  (1967)	  extended	  these	  insights	  and	  argued	  that	  under	  conditions	  of	  unknown	  interdependence,	  coordination	  is	  achieved	  by	  mutual	  adjustment.	  Coordinated	  exploration	  is	  only	  important	  when	  the	  nature	  of	  interdependence	  is	  unknown	  (or	  even	  unknowable)	  because	  of	  bounded	  rationality.	  	  The	  information	  processing	  view	  of	  organizations	  builds	  on	  these	  fundamental	  insights	  and	  seeks	  to	  understand	  how	  organizations	  can	  be	  designed	  to	  effectively	  operate	  in	  situations	  with	  differing	  levels	  of	  interdependence	  and	  uncertainty.	  This	  view	  suggests	  that	  the	  coordination	  capacity	  of	  the	  organization	  must	  match	  its	  coordination	  needs	  (Galbraith,	  1977;	  Tushman	  and	  Nadler,	  1978).	  Therefore,	  highly	  interdependent	  work	  must	  be	  structured	  to	  maximize	  opportunities	  for	  information	  transfer	  (Lawrence	  and	  Lorsch,	  1967;	  Tushman	  and	  Nadler,	  1978).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  well	  accepted	  that	  shared	  knowledge	  is	  necessary	  to	  coordinate	  epistemic	  interdependence	  (March	  and	  Simon,	  1958;	  Puranam,	  et	  al,	  2012).	  However,	  we	  also	  know	  that,	  in	  practice,	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  develop	  such	  shared	  knowledge	  among	  specialists	  (Lawrence	  and	  Lorsch,	  1967;	  Cronin	  and	  Weingart,	  2007).	  This	  is	  because	  the	  boundaries	  of	  specialization	  are	  also	  natural	  interpretive	  barriers	  that	  make	  the	  formation	  of	  shared	  understandings	  difficult	  (Lawrence	  and	  Lorsch,	  1967;	  Dougherty,	  1992;	  Heath	  and	  Staudenmayer,	  2000).	  Organizations	  employ	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different	  kinds	  of	  “integration	  mechanisms”	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  developing	  shared	  knowledge	  among	  specialists	  (Lawrence	  and	  Lorsch,	  1967;	  Clark	  and	  Fujimoto,	  1991;	  Iansiti,	  1995;	  Hoopes	  and	  Postrel,	  1999).	  	  	  However,	  different	  integration	  devices	  likely	  generate	  shared	  knowledge	  in	  different	  ways.	  For	  example,	  frequent	  communication	  vs.	  infrequent	  communication	  leads	  to	  different	  patterns	  of	  (shared)	  knowledge	  over	  time.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  type	  of	  integration	  mechanism	  employed	  is	  likely	  to	  impact	  the	  outcomes	  from	  coordinated	  exploration	  in	  two	  ways:	  (1)	  emergent	  shared	  knowledge	  directs	  search.	  (2)	  The	  resulting	  sampling	  of	  the	  search	  space	  influences	  what	  knowledge	  is	  acquired	  and	  shared	  (Denrell	  and	  March,	  2001).	  The	  aggregation	  of	  these	  effects	  across	  interdependent	  actors	  can	  fundamentally	  change	  joint	  search	  behavior	  from	  individual	  search	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  currently	  under-­‐theorized.	  	  Prior	  formal	  work	  on	  search	  has	  not	  addressed	  these	  issues,	  and	  therefore	  provides	  little	  guidance.	  As	  Knudsen	  and	  Levinthal	  (2007)	  observe,	  most	  models	  of	  organizational	  search	  are	  non-­‐organizational	  –	  they	  assume	  a	  unitary	  actor.	  Prior	  models	  of	  multi-­‐agent	  search	  ignore	  epistemic	  interdependence.	  Specifically,	  extant	  models	  of	  joint	  search	  attempt	  to	  understand	  how	  to	  balance	  exploration	  vs.	  exploitation	  and	  provide	  some	  subtle	  insights	  regarding	  how	  this	  tradeoff	  is	  achieved	  in	  organizations	  (see	  Rivkin	  and	  Siggelkow,	  2003;	  Siggelkow	  and	  Levinthal,	  2003;	  Siggelkow	  and	  Rivkin,	  2006;	  Fang,	  Lee	  and	  Schilling,	  2010),	  but	  have	  side-­‐stepped	  issues	  of	  coordination.	  For	  example,	  these	  studies	  underscore	  the	  importance	  of	  “slow	  learning”	  in	  balancing	  exploration	  concerns	  with	  demands	  for	  exploitation.	  However,	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘shared	  knowledge’	  that	  dominates	  the	  empirical	  literature	  is	  entirely	  absent	  from	  extant	  models	  of	  joint	  search.	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Consider	  the	  case	  of	  mutual	  adjustment	  between	  two	  agents:	  will	  increase	  in	  knowledge	  transfer	  and	  shared	  knowledge	  between	  these	  agents	  increase	  or	  reduce	  their	  joint	  exploration?	  Will	  it	  improve	  or	  reduce	  their	  chances	  of	  identifying	  the	  global	  peak,	  i.e.	  the	  maximal	  point	  in	  the	  task	  environment?	  In	  contrast,	  will	  agents’	  efforts	  to	  explore	  via	  slow	  learning	  perturb	  their	  efforts	  to	  maintain	  shared	  knowledge?	  To	  answer	  these	  questions,	  we	  need	  a	  model	  that	  takes	  into	  account	  how	  increasing	  “shared”	  knowledge	  impacts	  agents’	  search	  behavior.	  Since	  the	  above-­‐cited	  joint	  search	  models	  do	  not	  formally	  model	  agents’	  knowledge	  or	  spell	  out	  the	  procedures	  by	  which	  agents	  influence	  each	  other’s	  knowledge,	  they	  do	  not	  offer	  any	  predictions	  about	  the	  way	  two	  or	  more	  specialists	  best	  organize	  a	  process	  of	  joint	  search.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  prior	  work	  on	  joint	  search	  is	  fundamentally	  incomplete	  since	  it	  does	  not	  account	  for	  epistemic	  interdependence	  or	  how	  coordination	  is	  achieved.	  In	  contrast,	  models	  in	  game	  theory	  do	  take	  into	  account	  epistemic	  interdependence,	  but	  neglect	  search.	  Game-­‐theoretic	  models	  typically	  assume	  that	  agents	  make	  a	  choice	  over	  a	  known	  state-­‐space,	  and	  do	  not	  consider	  conditions	  where	  the	  agents’	  knowledge	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  state-­‐space	  is	  evolving.	  Typical	  game	  theoretic	  work	  does	  not	  model	  evolving	  game	  structures	  (Brandenburger,	  2008;	  Heifetz,	  2008),	  which	  is	  an	  important	  property	  in	  many	  real	  world	  problems.	  Models	  by	  Lounamaa	  and	  March	  (1987)	  and	  Puranam	  and	  Swamy	  (2012),	  though	  boundedly	  rational,	  since	  actors	  do	  not	  know	  the	  actions/payoffs	  available	  to	  the	  interdependent	  agent,	  also	  assume	  that	  actors	  know	  all	  actions	  available	  to	  them.	  	  In	  other	  words	  we	  have	  very	  little	  knowledge	  about	  coordinated	  exploration,	  even	  though	  it	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  very	  important	  problem	  for	  organizations.	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THEORY	  AND	  HYPOTHESES	  Lawrence	  and	  Lorsch	  (1967)	  argued	  that	  as	  task	  environments	  become	  more	  complex,	  specialized	  “differentiated”	  units	  become	  necessary	  to	  attend	  to	  specific	  environmental	  attributes.	  Differentiation	  refers	  to	  the	  differences	  across	  organizational	  sub-­‐units	  that	  arise	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  their	  local	  adaptation	  to	  unit-­‐specific	  tasks	  and	  environments.	  Depending	  on	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  environment,	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  differentiated	  units	  need	  to	  be	  more	  or	  less	  ‘integrated’	  for	  the	  organization	  to	  achieve	  desirable	  outcomes.	  The	  most	  complex	  environments	  demand	  both	  high	  levels	  of	  differentiation	  across	  sub-­‐units	  and	  high	  levels	  of	  integration	  among	  these	  units,	  giving	  rise	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  coordinated	  exploration.	  	  The	  information	  processing	  theory	  of	  organizations	  suggests	  that	  highly	  interdependent	  work	  must	  be	  organized	  such	  that	  there	  is	  a	  high	  level	  of	  communication	  between	  the	  agents	  (Galbraith,	  1977;	  Tushman	  and	  Nadler,	  1978;	  Nadler	  and	  Tushman,	  1998).	  High	  levels	  of	  communication	  increases	  the	  level	  of	  common	  ground	  –	  knowledge	  that	  is	  shared	  and	  known	  to	  be	  shared	  –	  among	  the	  agents,	  thereby	  promoting	  coordination	  (Simon,	  1947;	  Schelling,	  1960;	  Srikanth	  and	  Puranam,	  2011).	  Even	  though	  this	  theory	  is	  about	  coordination	  and	  not	  search,	  it	  has	  been	  extensively	  used	  to	  make	  predictions	  in	  situations	  of	  coordinated	  exploration.	  For	  example,	  it	  is	  almost	  axiomatic	  in	  the	  new	  product	  development	  (NPD)	  literature	  that	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  information	  transfer	  between	  agents	  is	  associated	  with	  better	  performance	  (see	  reviews	  by	  Krishnan	  and	  Ulrich,	  2001;	  Brown	  and	  Eisenhardt,	  1995).	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  arguments	  made	  by	  the	  information	  processing	  theory	  concern	  efficiency;	  organizing	  work	  with	  greater	  amounts	  of	  information	  transfer	  than	  necessary	  would	  be	  effective	  in	  uncovering	  good	  solutions,	  but	  more	  expensive	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(Thompson,	  1967;	  Galbraith,	  1977;	  Tushman	  and	  Nadler,	  1978).	  The	  prediction	  from	  this	  stream	  of	  work	  can	  be	  summarized	  in	  the	  hypothesis	  below:	  	  
Hypothesis	  1a:	  Specialist	  agents	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  communication	  will	  be	  
more	  likely	  to	  identify	  high	  value	  combinations	  than	  agents	  with	  lower	  levels	  of	  communication	  in	  problems	  of	  coordinated	  exploration.	  	  The	  above	  prediction,	  however,	  is	  not	  uncontroversial.	  For	  example,	  empirical	  work	  in	  the	  NPD	  literature	  suggests	  that	  more	  intense	  communication	  between	  different	  specialists	  may	  lead	  to	  poor	  innovative	  outcomes	  (Tyre	  and	  Hauptman,	  1992;	  Hauptman	  and	  Hirji,	  1996;	  Song	  and	  Montoya-­‐Weiss,	  1998;	  Song	  and	  Xie,	  2000;	  Song,	  Thieme	  and	  Xie,	  1998;	  Bettenhausen,	  1991;	  Shenhar	  et	  al,	  2002;	  Gomes	  et	  al,	  2003).	  Montoya-­‐Weiss	  and	  Calantone,	  (1994)	  observe	  that	  few	  empirical	  studies	  use	  technological	  innovativeness	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  NPD	  success;	  instead	  market	  share,	  financial	  success,	  or	  most	  frequently,	  speed	  of	  development	  are	  used	  as	  proxies	  indicative	  of	  NPD	  success.	  When	  innovativeness	  is	  the	  key	  criterion	  for	  defining	  success	  of	  NPD	  projects	  these	  studies	  suggest	  that	  facilitating	  very	  high	  levels	  of	  communication	  among	  the	  specialist	  agents	  may	  be	  associated	  with	  poor	  performance.	  The	  literature	  on	  boundary	  spanners	  reaches	  similar	  conclusions.	  They	  find	  that	  projects	  with	  boundary	  spanners	  tend	  to	  perform	  better	  than	  projects	  without	  these	  (Tushman	  and	  Katz,	  1980;	  Carlile,	  2004),	  but	  even	  in	  large	  projects	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  interdependence,	  very	  few	  boundary	  spanners	  are	  required	  to	  achieve	  good	  outcomes	  (Tushman	  and	  Scanlan,	  1981).	  	  These	  empirical	  findings	  suggest	  that	  a	  high	  level	  of	  information	  transfer	  is	  unnecessary	  and	  perhaps	  even	  harmful	  in	  situations	  of	  coordinated	  exploration.	  However,	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  underlie	  these	  findings	  are	  unclear.	  Many	  large	  sample	  studies	  typically	  hypothesize	  that	  high	  levels	  of	  communication	  is	  associated	  with	  better	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performance,	  but	  do	  not	  find	  that	  relationship.	  A	  plausible	  mechanism	  is	  that	  the	  difficulty	  in	  aligning	  mental	  models	  of	  different	  specialists	  leads	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  shortcuts	  and	  therefore	  lower	  performance	  (Tyre	  and	  Hauptman,	  1992).	  For	  example,	  Davis	  and	  Eisenhardt	  (2011)	  explore	  innovations	  from	  high-­‐technology	  alliances,	  and	  find	  that	  a	  consensual	  leadership	  style	  promotes	  significant	  and	  costly	  attempts	  at	  sharing	  information,	  which	  leads	  these	  firms	  to	  quickly	  adopting	  a	  ‘lowest	  common	  denominator’	  approach.	  In	  other	  words,	  since	  significant	  effort	  is	  needed	  to	  transfer	  knowledge	  across	  specialists	  with	  incompatible	  mental	  models	  or	  ‘thought	  worlds’	  (Heath	  and	  Staudenmayer,	  2000;	  Dougherty,	  1992;	  2001),	  such	  efforts	  are	  likely	  prone	  to	  conflict	  and	  delays	  (Ancona	  and	  Caldwell,	  1989).	  As	  a	  consequence,	  teams	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  pursue	  objectives	  that	  are	  minimally	  acceptable	  for	  all	  team	  members	  rather	  than	  explore	  broadly	  to	  achieve	  more	  rewarding	  outcomes.	  These	  observations	  lead	  to	  a	  prediction	  that	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  previous	  hypothesis:	  	  
Hypothesis	  1b:	  Specialist	  agents	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  communication	  will	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  identify	  high	  value	  combinations	  than	  agents	  with	  lower	  levels	  of	  communication	  in	  problems	  of	  coordinated	  exploration.	  	  One	  approach	  to	  the	  differentiation-­‐integration	  trade-­‐off	  and	  the	  difficulty	  of	  communicating	  across	  specialist	  boundaries	  is	  the	  employment	  of	  agents	  with	  T-­‐shaped	  skills	  –	  i.e.,	  deep	  domain	  expertise	  in	  one	  domain,	  represented	  by	  the	  vertical	  bar	  of	  the	  “T”	  and	  adequate	  knowledge	  in	  other	  domains,	  represented	  by	  the	  horizontal	  bar	  of	  the	  “T”	  (Iansiti,	  1993;	  Leonard	  Barton,	  1995).	  Individuals	  with	  T-­‐shaped	  skills	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  search	  for	  solutions	  to	  problems	  not	  only	  from	  their	  deep	  expertise,	  but	  also	  taking	  into	  account	  how	  their	  choice	  is	  likely	  to	  interact	  with	  other	  constraints	  that	  a	  joint	  solution	  needs	  to	  satisfy.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  our	  windmill	  example,	  if	  the	  structural	  mechanics	  engineers	  possess	  T-­‐shaped	  skills,	  they	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  limit	  search	  for	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solutions	  to	  the	  strongest	  materials	  such	  as	  steel,	  since	  they	  recognize	  that	  these	  also	  tend	  to	  be	  heavy	  and	  therefore	  are	  unlikely	  to	  generate	  much	  power.	  The	  employment	  of	  individuals	  with	  T-­‐shaped	  skills	  is	  therefore	  likely	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  successful	  problem	  solving	  across	  multiple	  domains	  (Madhavan	  and	  Grover,	  1998).	  This	  suggests	  that	  agents	  with	  T-­‐shaped	  skills	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  successful	  than	  individual	  specialist	  searchers.	  Therefore,	  we	  hypothesize	  that:	  	  
Hypothesis	  2a:	  Agents	  with	  T-­‐shaped	  skills	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  identify	  high	  value	  combinations	  in	  problems	  of	  coordinated	  exploration	  when	  compared	  to	  specialists.	  Though	  the	  single-­‐searcher	  with	  T-­‐shaped	  skills	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  successful	  than	  the	  single	  specialist	  searcher,	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  a	  team	  of	  agents	  with	  T-­‐shaped	  skills	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  successful	  than	  a	  team	  of	  specialists.	  First,	  successful	  coordination	  is	  not	  determined	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  total	  knowledge	  available	  to	  the	  agents,	  but	  by	  the	  level	  of	  common	  ground	  (Clark,	  1996;	  Puranam	  et	  al,	  2012).	  Though	  a	  group	  of	  agents	  with	  T-­‐shaped	  skills	  may	  possess	  higher	  levels	  of	  knowledge	  than	  a	  group	  of	  specialists,	  such	  agents	  acting	  autonomously,	  without	  taking	  active	  steps	  to	  coordinate	  and	  share	  their	  knowledge,	  are	  still	  likely	  to	  fare	  poorly	  in	  problems	  of	  coordinated	  exploration.	  	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  agents	  with	  T-­‐shaped	  skills,	  because	  they	  share	  some	  understanding	  of	  the	  complementary	  domains	  are	  likely	  to	  interact	  with	  each	  other	  more	  fruitfully	  (Madhavan	  and	  Grover,	  1998;	  Iansiti,	  1993).	  However,	  according	  to	  hypothesis	  1b,	  perhaps	  interaction	  between	  such	  agents	  may	  also	  lead	  to	  poor	  innovative	  outcomes.	  Recent	  empirical	  work	  bolsters	  this	  premise	  by	  suggesting	  that	  employment	  of	  personnel	  with	  T-­‐shaped	  skills	  (as	  opposed	  to	  specialists)	  is	  not	  necessarily	  associated	  with	  new	  knowledge	  creation	  or	  effective	  exploration	  in	  a	  NPD	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context	  (Lee	  and	  Choi,	  2003;	  Tsai	  and	  Huang,	  2008).	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  these	  studies	  hypothesize	  that	  employing	  personnel	  with	  T-­‐shaped	  skills	  should	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  performance,	  but	  fail	  to	  find	  one	  empirically.	  Therefore,	  we	  hypothesize:	  	  
Hypothesis	  2b:	  (teams	  of)	  Agents	  with	  T-­‐shaped	  skills	  will	  not	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  identify	  high	  value	  combinations	  in	  problems	  of	  coordinated	  exploration	  when	  compared	  to	  (teams	  of)	  specialists.	  	  The	  contrasting	  hypotheses	  argued	  above	  arise	  from	  two	  pathologies:	  the	  inability	  to	  coordinate	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  adequate	  exploration	  on	  the	  other.	  Formal	  work	  that	  models	  firm	  adaptation	  as	  search	  over	  a	  rugged	  landscape	  suggests	  that	  local	  adaptation	  traps	  firms	  in	  local	  optima,	  and	  exploration	  is	  crucial	  for	  superior	  performance	  in	  such	  problems	  (Levinthal,	  1997).	  Exploration	  aims	  to	  provide	  a	  basis	  for	  better	  choices	  in	  the	  future,	  as	  opposed	  to	  maximizing	  the	  immediate	  returns	  (Gittins,	  1989).	  Unconstrained	  exploration,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  also	  leads	  to	  poor	  outcomes,	  since	  the	  agents	  never	  exploit	  the	  promising	  alternatives	  that	  their	  exploration	  highlighted	  (Sutton	  and	  Barto,	  1998).	  Studies	  of	  organizational	  search	  and	  learning	  have	  convincingly	  demonstrated	  the	  need	  to	  balance	  exploration	  with	  exploitation	  for	  superior	  performance.	  	  Of	  course,	  agents	  need	  not	  explicitly	  engage	  in	  exploration	  activities.	  Contexts	  that	  undermine	  efficient	  adaptation	  by	  disrupting	  action-­‐outcome-­‐feedback	  linkages	  allow	  agents	  to	  “wander”	  in	  the	  search	  space,	  a	  process	  that	  automatically	  promotes	  exploration	  (Denrell	  and	  March,	  2001;	  March,	  1991).	  These	  “slow-­‐learning”	  effects	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  particularly	  beneficial	  in	  complex	  environments	  that	  require	  broad	  exploration	  of	  the	  state-­‐space	  (Knudsen	  and	  Levinthal,	  2007;	  March,	  2006).	  Based	  on	  these	  studies,	  one	  would	  predict	  that:	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Hypothesis	  3a:	  Agents	  who	  explore	  moderately	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  find	  high	  value	  combinations	  in	  problems	  of	  coordinated	  exploration	  than	  agents	  who	  do	  not	  explore.	  	  It	  is	  however	  unclear	  whether	  the	  above	  prediction	  derived	  from	  models	  of	  unitary	  search	  is	  accurate	  in	  problems	  of	  coordinated	  exploration.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  epistemic	  interdependence	  condition	  that	  characterizes	  coordinated	  exploration	  leads	  to	  two	  pathologies	  in	  learning.	  First,	  the	  feedback	  received	  by	  the	  agents	  is	  the	  joint	  payoff	  associated	  with	  both	  their	  and	  the	  other	  agent’s	  actions.	  Therefore,	  agents	  are	  unable	  to	  distinguish	  whether	  the	  positive	  or	  negative	  feedback	  outcomes	  are	  a	  consequence	  of	  their	  own	  action	  or	  the	  action	  of	  the	  interdependent	  others	  (Lounamaa	  and	  March,	  1987;	  Puranam	  and	  Swamy,	  2011).	  This	  impedes	  adaptation	  by	  allowing	  agents	  to	  continue	  searching	  in	  an	  unprofitable	  region	  of	  the	  landscape,	  because	  they	  may	  attribute	  poor	  payoffs	  to	  actions	  of	  the	  other	  agent	  rather	  than	  to	  their	  own	  misperception	  of	  action-­‐outcome	  linkages.	  In	  other	  words,	  feedback	  ambiguity	  promotes	  mutual-­‐confusion	  and	  in	  effect	  misleads	  agents	  into	  maintaining	  a	  flawed	  mental	  model	  of	  the	  landscape.	  	  These	  effects	  of	  epistemic	  interdependence	  can	  be	  countered	  if	  agents	  maintain	  fully	  aligned	  mental	  models	  of	  the	  search	  space	  at	  every	  point	  in	  time.	  Alignment	  of	  mental	  models	  allows	  the	  interdependent	  actors	  to	  anticipate	  the	  others	  expected	  actions	  (as	  in	  game	  theoretic	  models).	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  it	  is	  commonly	  thought	  that	  high	  levels	  of	  communication	  among	  interdependent	  agents	  can	  facilitate	  coordination.	  However,	  this	  comes	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  joint-­‐myopia	  –	  reducing	  exploration	  of	  the	  search	  space	  so	  the	  agents	  focus	  on	  a	  narrow	  portion	  of	  the	  landscape	  that	  both	  see	  as	  beneficial.	  In	  other	  words,	  as	  the	  agents	  receive	  more	  information	  regarding	  each	  other,	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  choose	  actions	  that	  reliably	  take	  into	  account	  others’	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preferences,	  thereby	  limiting	  search	  to	  areas	  known	  to	  be	  mutually	  beneficial.	  This	  narrowing	  of	  search,	  important	  for	  coordinating,	  necessarily	  comes	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  more	  superficial	  understanding	  of	  other	  regions	  in	  the	  landscape	  that	  perhaps	  are	  more	  valuable.	  For	  example	  behavioral	  economists	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  in	  coordination	  games,	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  for	  the	  group	  to	  shift	  from	  a	  low-­‐performing	  equilibrium	  to	  a	  high-­‐performing	  equilibrium,	  since	  it	  requires	  a	  coordinated	  shift	  among	  all	  participants	  (Camerer,	  2003;	  Van	  Huyck,	  Battalio	  and	  Cook,	  1997).	  In	  the	  face	  of	  bounded	  rationality,	  agents	  do	  not	  know	  if	  any	  other	  better	  equilibrium	  exists,	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  achieve	  a	  coordinated	  shift.	  Theories	  of	  unitary	  search	  argue	  that	  such	  myopia	  can	  always	  be	  overcome	  with	  deliberate	  exploration	  strategies,	  as	  suggested	  by	  H3a.	  However,	  in	  problems	  of	  coordinated	  exploration,	  as	  in	  all	  coupled	  learning	  problems,	  exploration	  has	  the	  consequence	  of	  increasing	  unintended	  interference	  in	  agent	  learning	  and	  therefore	  is	  unlikely	  to	  lead	  to	  superior	  search	  outcomes.	  Therefore	  we	  argue	  that:	  	  
Hypothesis	  3b:	  Agents	  who	  explore	  moderately	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  find	  high	  value	  combinations	  in	  problems	  of	  coordinated	  exploration	  than	  agents	  who	  do	  not	  explore.	  The	  general	  mechanism	  that	  underpins	  our	  theory	  is	  the	  tradeoff	  between	  the	  need	  to	  align	  mental	  models	  in	  the	  face	  of	  epistemic	  interdependence	  and	  the	  need	  for	  adequate	  exploration.	  This	  tradeoff	  is	  challenging	  because	  of	  bounded	  rationality.	  Lack	  of	  aligned	  mental	  models	  results	  in	  poor	  performance	  because	  of	  mutual-­‐confusion,	  but	  alignment	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  joint-­‐myopia	  also	  leads	  to	  sub-­‐optimal	  outcomes.	  The	  greater	  the	  alignment	  in	  mental	  models,	  the	  more	  the	  team	  chooses	  options	  that	  is	  likely	  to	  result	  in	  a	  positive	  payoff	  given	  their	  (accurate)	  understanding	  of	  what	  the	  other	  actors	  are	  likely	  to	  choose.	  However,	  this	  sensitivity	  to	  epistemic	  interdependence	  stifles	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exploration	  of	  the	  search	  space	  (whose	  payoff	  potential	  is	  unknown)	  by	  concentrating	  search	  effort	  in	  the	  sub-­‐space	  that	  is	  of	  immediate	  mutual	  interest	  to	  all	  agents.	  	  Therefore	  outcomes	  to	  coordinated	  exploration	  needs	  to	  balance	  mutual-­‐confusion	  against	  joint-­‐myopia,	  which	  is	  likely	  influenced	  by	  the	  relationships	  between	  the	  following	  elements:	  (1)	  the	  agent's	  initial	  knowledge;	  (2)	  agents’	  learning	  based	  on	  (2a)	  the	  agent’s	  own	  search	  efforts	  and	  (2b)	  the	  extent	  of	  integration	  with	  the	  other	  agent;	  and	  (3)	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  landscape.	  Understanding	  coordinated	  exploration	  therefore	  requires	  a	  careful	  trace	  of	  the	  evolving	  relationships	  between	  integration	  mechanisms,	  individual	  mental	  models,	  and	  the	  level	  of	  shared	  mental	  representations.	  As	  in	  much	  analysis	  of	  dynamical	  systems,	  a	  computational	  model	  is	  a	  suitable	  method	  to	  trace	  these	  feedback-­‐driven	  interacting	  relationships.	  	  
A	  MODEL	  OF	  COORDINATED	  EXPLORATION	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  both	  the	  coordination	  and	  search	  aspects	  of	  coordinated	  exploration,	  we	  need	  to	  model	  agent	  knowledge	  or	  cognition	  as	  an	  information	  structure	  that	  bears	  some	  (potentially	  crude)	  resemblance	  to	  the	  (potentially	  unknowable)	  real	  world.	  The	  agent’s	  choices	  are	  informed	  by	  this	  information	  structure	  (or	  mental	  model),	  and	  it	  evolves	  over	  time	  with	  feedback.	  The	  heart	  of	  coordinated	  exploration	  is	  that	  agents	  are	  constrained	  by	  epistemic	  interdependence.	  In	  a	  dynamic	  perspective,	  this	  means	  that	  the	  evolution	  of	  one	  agent's	  information	  structure	  is	  significantly	  influenced	  by	  the	  (potentially	  unobservable)	  actions	  of	  the	  other	  agent.	  This	  property	  makes	  learning	  from	  experience	  much	  more	  difficult	  in	  joint	  search	  than	  for	  the	  single	  searcher.	  Therefore,	  to	  model	  coordinated	  exploration,	  we	  need	  an	  approach	  to	  represent	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  agent’s	  information	  structure	  and	  its	  evolution	  with	  feedback.	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Partition	  Models:	  An	  approach	  to	  modeling	  knowledge	  The	  conception	  of	  knowledge	  as	  partitions	  in	  a	  state	  space	  developed	  in	  Samuelson	  (2004)	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  handy	  tool	  to	  model	  the	  agent’s	  evolving	  information	  structure	  in	  coordinated	  exploration.	  The	  study	  of	  knowledge	  has	  become	  quite	  central	  in	  economics	  because	  “questions	  of	  who	  knows	  what	  play	  a	  role	  in	  examining	  basic	  economic	  issues,	  such	  as	  when	  gains	  from	  trade	  exist	  and	  when	  these	  gains	  can	  be	  realized”	  (Samuelson,	  2004,	  p.	  367).	  Economists	  are	  typically	  interested	  in	  what	  people	  know,	  and	  what	  they	  know	  about	  what	  others	  know	  (mutual	  knowledge).	  We	  use	  this	  basic	  apparatus	  to	  model	  the	  ‘uniqueness’	  and	  ‘sharedness’	  in	  agents’	  knowledge	  structures	  to	  understand	  how	  search	  and	  coordination	  proceeds	  in	  parallel.	  	  Until	  recently,	  the	  question	  of	  cognition	  was	  not	  considered	  in	  models	  of	  organizational	  search	  and	  learning.	  Instead	  of	  explicitly	  modeling	  cognition,	  the	  typical	  approach	  is	  to	  assume	  that	  searching	  agents	  learn	  fitness	  values	  in	  various	  regions	  of	  a	  (NK)	  landscape	  that	  represents	  the	  agents'	  task	  environment2.	  While	  this	  abstract	  characterization	  of	  cognition	  has	  proven	  useful	  for	  understanding	  fundamental	  properties	  of	  search	  in	  complex	  task	  environments,	  it	  is	  rather	  incomplete	  since	  it	  cannot	  readily	  account	  for	  epistemic	  interdependence.	  	  To	  understand	  how	  two	  or	  more	  agents	  are	  actually	  able	  to	  coordinate	  exploration	  of	  some	  search	  space,	  it	  is	  critical	  to	  understand	  how	  their	  cognitive	  representations	  include	  information	  that	  can	  direct	  search	  conditional	  on	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  other	  agent.	  It	  is	  here	  that	  the	  knowledge	  as	  partition	  approach	  comes	  in	  handy.	  As	  explained	  in	  Samuelson	  (2004),	  economists	  model	  knowledge	  as	  a	  state-­‐space,	  so	  what	  someone	  "knows"	  is	  some	  state	  of	  a	  partition	  of	  the	  space.	  The	  finer	  the	  partition	  of	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Of	  course,	  one	  may	  argue	  that	  the	  agent’s	  cognition,	  in	  this	  case,	  is	  represented	  by	  a	  simple	  mental	  map	  with	  a	  fixed	  structure	  comprising	  N	  policy	  attributes	  whose	  values	  are	  changed	  according	  to	  the	  information	  uncovered	  when	  the	  agent	  is	  searching	  the	  landscape.	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agent’s	  information	  structure,	  the	  greater	  her	  knowledge	  regarding	  the	  space.	  Knowledge	  represents	  category	  learning:	  in	  the	  space	  where	  an	  ignorant	  agent	  sees	  only	  one	  category,	  a	  more	  knowledgeable	  agent	  can	  identify	  several	  nuanced	  categories;	  for	  example,	  distinguish	  wood	  as	  pine,	  cherry,	  or	  oak.	  In	  search	  models,	  the	  task	  of	  the	  agent	  is	  to	  partition	  the	  information	  structure	  so	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  identify	  elements	  (in	  the	  knowledge	  space)	  that	  likely	  correspond	  to	  objects	  that	  are	  actually	  of	  high	  value.	  Search	  then,	  proceeds	  by	  going	  through	  the	  current	  information	  partitions	  or,	  if	  necessary	  by	  further	  partitioning	  (or	  fine-­‐graining)	  the	  information	  structure.	  	  To	   make	   this	   approach	   concrete,	   consider	   again	   the	   windmill	   design	   problem	  from	   the	   introduction.	  Bounded	   rationality	   implies	   that	  ex	  ante,	   the	   two	  engineers	  do	  not	  know	  the	  full	  set	  of	  materials	  and	  shapes	  that	  they	  could	  recombine.	  For	  example,	  the	   initial	   knowledge	   of	   the	   structural	   materials	   engineer	   can	   be	   limited	   to	   three	  categories	   of	   candidate	   materials,	   wood,	   metal	   and	   other;	   i.e.,	   her	   initial	   knowledge	  consists	  of	  only	  three	  partitions.	  Out	  of	  these,	  she	  may	  select	  a	  promising	  candidate,	  say	  wood,	   and	   investigate	   it	   further.	   For	   example,	   she	   may	   discover	   that	   there	   are	   two	  different	   types	   of	  wood,	   hard	   or	   soft.	   This	   represents	   an	   additional	   partition	   or	   fine-­‐graining	  of	  her	  mental	  model	  of	  the	  search	  space	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  pertains	  to	  wood.	  Among	  hardwoods	  she	  may	  discover	  that	  the	  oak	  behaves	  differently	  from	  elm,	  which	  in	  turn	  is	  different	  from	  pine.	  This	  further	  fine-­‐graining	  of	  her	  knowledge	  is	  represented	  as	  more	  partitions	   in	   her	   information	   structure.	   Note	   that	   in	   this	   example,	   the	   engineer’s	  knowledge	   partitions	   are	   becoming	  more	   fine-­‐grained	   in	   the	   sub-­‐space	   pertaining	   to	  wood,	   whereas	   her	   knowledge	   regarding	   other	   regions	   of	   the	   search	   space	   is	  unchanged.	  	  The	   other	   interdependent	   agent	   in	   this	   task,	   the	   aerodynamics	   engineer	   likely	  has	  partitioned	  the	  joint	  search	  space	  in	  a	  different	  manner,	  depending	  on	  shapes,	  such	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as	   straight	   or	   curved.	   For	   example,	   if	   the	   new	   partition	   available	   to	   the	   structural	  mechanics	   engineer,	   hard	   wood	   vs.	   soft	   wood,	   is	   not	   available	   to	   the	   aerodynamics	  engineer	   and	   vice	   versa,	   the	   two	   agents	  may	   come	   to	   different	   conclusions	   regarding	  which	   regions	   in	   the	   search	   space	   are	   attractive	   and	   therefore	   may	   make	   mutually	  inconsistent	   choices;	   i.e.,	   each	   selects	   a	   solution	   that	   appears	   to	   be	   useful	   from	   their	  own	   point	   of	   view,	   but	   are	   in	   fact	   jointly	   useless.	   This	   is	   the	   challenge	   of	   epistemic	  interdependence	  that	  agents	  involved	  in	  coordinated	  exploration	  need	  to	  solve.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  as	  agents	   increasingly	   fine-­‐grain	   their	  partition	  structure,	   their	  mental	   models	   become	   increasingly	   incongruent,	   and	   therefore	   they	   need	   to	   expend	  more	   effort	   in	   aligning	   their	   mental	   models.	   Partition	   models	   elegantly	   capture	   this	  trade-­‐off	  that	  increasing	  differentiation,	  modeled	  as	  more	  fine-­‐grained	  partitions	  of	  the	  search	  space,	  requires	  increasing	  effort	  in	  integration,	  modeled	  as	  increasing	  alignment	  of	  the	  agents’	  partition	  structures.	  	  
Model	  Mechanics	  To	  understand	   coordinated	  exploration	  we	  model	   search	   in	   a	   two-­‐dimensional	  landscape	  –	  such	  as	  structural	  mechanics	  and	  aerodynamics	   in	  our	  windmill	  example.	  The	   search	   landscape	   is	   a	   matrix	   where	   each	   combination	   of	   the	   two	   technologies	  defines	  a	  coordinate	  with	  an	  associated	  payoff	  (see	  Figure	  1).	  	  Two	   agents	   search	   in	   this	   landscape;	   the	   row	   agent	   chooses	   the	   row	   and	   the	  column	  agent	  chooses	  the	  column.	   In	  our	  example,	   to	  create	  the	  next	  prototype	  of	   the	  new	  windmill,	  the	  structural	  mechanics	  engineer	  (row	  agent)	  chooses	  the	  material,	  such	  as	  wood	  vs.	  metal,	  and	   the	  aerodynamics	  engineer	   (column	  agent)	  chooses	   the	  shape,	  such	  as	  curved	  vs.	  straight.	  Once	  these	  agents	  have	  chosen	  in	  their	  own	  dimensions,	  a	  prototype	   is	   created	  with	   these	   joint	   properties	   (e.g.,	   a	  windmill	  made	   of	  wood	  with	  straight	  blades),	  which	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  payoff.	  Figure	  2	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	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baseline	  model	  and	  Table	  1	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  all	  parameters.	  The	  parameters	  in	  Table	   1	   are	   explained	   in	   greater	   detail	   below.	   These	   were	   chosen	   after	   numerous	  robustness	   checks	   to	   fine-­‐tune	   the	   model.	   Next,	   we	   briefly	   explain	   how	   the	   steps	   in	  Figure	  2	  are	  implemented.	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  	  	  INSERT	  FIGURE	  1,	  FIGURE	  2	  AND	  TABLE	  1	  HERE	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  	  	  
Initial	  Conditions:	  The	  Search	  Space:	  As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1,	  in	  the	  baseline	  model,	  the	  search	   space	   is	   a	   matrix	   defined	   by	   64	   possible	   choices	   in	   two	   complimentary	  dimensions	  (row,	  column),	  and	  each	  of	  these	  64x64	  combinations	   is	  associated	  with	  a	  payoff.3	  We	   initially	   exercise	   our	  model	   with	   a	   landscape	   that	   contains	   two	   peaks	   of	  varying	  heights	   as	   shown	   in	  Figure	  1.	  This	   landscape	  emphasizes	  both	   search	  –	   since	  there	   are	   only	   two	   valuable	   peaks	   among	   the	   possible	   4096	   combinations,	   and	  coordination	  –	  since	  each	  peak	  acts	  as	  a	  Nash	  equilibrium	  in	  this	  game.	  Since	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  landscape	  can	  materially	  affect	  successful	  strategies	  for	  coordinated	  exploration,	  we	  ensure	  robustness	  using	  different	  landscapes	  that	  lay	  higher	  or	  lower	  emphasis	  on	  search	  vs.	  coordination.	  	  
Initial	  Conditions:	  The	  agent’s	  mental	  model	  of	  the	  search	  space:	  At	  t=0,	  agents	  are	  endowed	  with	  a	  mental	  model	  of	   the	  search	  space.	  This	  mental	  model	  consists	  of	   two	  elements:	  (1)	  available	  decision	  choices	  and	  (2)	  payoffs	  associated	  with	  these	  choices.	  Our	   agents	   are	   boundedly	   rational	   and	   do	   not	   see	   all	   the	   64x64	   choices	   available	   to	  them	  ex-­‐ante,	  and	  as	  a	  consequence	  do	  not	  accurately	  know	  the	  associated	  payoffs.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 It may be helpful to draw a brief analogy of our model with the NK modeling structure. In our model, N=2, 
since agents are searching only in two decision parameters. In the NK model, agents have a dichotomous choice, 
0 or 1 for each decision variable. In our model, agents have 64 choices for each decision variable. 
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At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  simulation,	  agents	  do	  not	  have	  fine-­‐grained	  partitions	  of	  the	  search	  space,	  i.e.	  they	  only	  see	  a	  very	  limited	  number	  of	  choices	  for	  each	  dimension.	  Figure	  3	  provides	  an	  example	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  windmill	  example,	  where	  the	  agents	  see	   a	   3x2	   choice	   set	   instead	   of	   reality	   (the	   full	   64x64	  matrix).	   The	   sharpness	   of	   the	  agents’	  initial	  vision	  (knowledge)	  –	  i.e.,	  the	  number	  of	  choices	  in	  each	  dimension	  that	  an	  agent	  can	  see	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  game	  –	   is	  specified	  as	  a	  parameter	   in	  the	  model,	  and	  may	  vary	  from	  1	  (most	  blurred)	  to	  64	  (sharpest)	  along	  each	  dimension.	  	  The	  agents’	  limited	  vision	  of	  the	  choice	  set	  also	  limits	  their	  understanding	  of	  the	  performance	  consequences	  of	  the	  choices	  set.	  The	  payoff	  the	  agent	  associates	  with	  each	  perceived	  cell	  in	  the	  matrix	  is	  the	  average	  of	  payoffs	  for	  the	  “real”	  combinations	  that	  are	  latent	   in	   that	  cell.	  For	  example,	   in	  Figure	  4,	   for	   the	  wood/straight	  combination	  –	   they	  see	  the	  average	  for	  all	  woods	  and	  all	  straight	  shapes.4	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  	  	  FIGURE	  3	  and	  FIGURE	  4	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  	  	  Agents’	  initial	  mental	  models	  get	  more	  refined	  with	  time	  as	  they	  generate	  more	  fine-­‐grained	  knowledge	  partitions.	  As	  the	  choice	  set	  expands,	  the	  payoff	  associated	  with	  each	   element	   in	   the	   choice	   set	   also	   becomes	  more	   accurate.5	  Refining	  mental	  models	  involves	  two	  actions:	  first	  choosing	  the	  portion	  of	  the	  landscape	  to	  further	  explore	  (step	  1),	  and	  then	  actually	  exploring	  (gaining	  a	  sharper	  vision	  of)	  that	  region	  (steps	  2	  and	  3).	  The	  SWITCH	  operation	  chooses	  the	  region	  for	  further	  exploration	  and	  the	  DIG	  operation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 By assumption, agents have correct expectations regarding the attractiveness of each choice they see. This 
treatment is similar to the payoff matrix seen by agents in Gavetti and Levinthal (2000). This baseline 
assumption could be refined in future research by adding noise to expectations. In addition, agents have 
commensurate mental models. They agree that there are two dimensions, and they both see the same payoffs for 
identical sub-spaces, with no idiosyncratic distortions or filtering errors. 
5 We do not model noise in payoffs. When our agent achieves perfect vision of the choice set, the agent 
simultaneously achieves perfect information regarding the payoffs of each choice-set. Introducing noisy payoffs 
may be a very interesting extension to this model (see also previous footnote). 
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refines	  the	  agents’	  current	  mental	  model	  in	  the	  specific	  location	  determined	  by	  SWITCH.	  These	  are	  explained	  in	  detail	  below.	  	  
Step	  1:	   SWITCH	   to	  attractive	   sub-­‐space	  given	   current	   knowledge:	   Switching	  captures	  the	  logic	  of	  how	  agents’	  change	  the	  focus	  of	  their	  attention	  from	  one	  region	  in	  the	   landscape	   to	   another.	   Initially,	   our	   agents	   are	   positioned	   at	   random	   in	   the	  landscape.	  They	  observe	  the	  payoff	  to	  their	  current	  choice	  and	  the	  payoff	  to	  all	  the	  other	  choices	   available	   to	   them	  based	  on	   their	   current	  mental	  model.	  Our	   agents	   are	  profit	  seeking	  and	  therefore	  switch	  to	  the	  most	  promising	  alternative	  as	  currently	  perceived.	  This	   is	   similar	   to	   Simon’s	   (1962)	   conception	   of	   choosing	   between	   branches	   of	   the	  search	   tree	   for	   further	   exploration,	   depending	   on	   the	   agents’	   expectations	   regarding	  which	   branch	   appears	   most	   attractive.	   For	   instance,	   in	   Figure	   4,	   the	   agent	   currently	  positioned	  in	  Other/Curved	  may	  instead	  choose	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  option	  Wood/Straight	  for	   further	   investigation	   based	   on	   the	   perceived	   payoffs.	   Note	   that	   the	   agent’s	  perception	   of	   attractiveness	   is	   dependent	   on	   their	   current	   (imperfect)	  mental	  model,	  and	  as	  shown	  in	  figure	  4,	  they	  may	  switch	  away	  from	  a	  region	  that	  contains	  the	  global	  peak.	  	   ‘Switch’	  is	  accomplished	  as	  follows.	  Assuming	  that	  both	  the	  row	  and	  the	  column	  agent	  start	  with	   identical	  mental	  models	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  4,	   the	  row	  agent	  chooses	  wood	   for	   material	   and	   the	   column	   agent	   chooses	   straight	   for	   shape,	   since	   each	  independently	   believes	   that	   this	   is	   the	   best	   sub-­‐space.	   When	   each	   agent	   makes	   its	  choice,	  they	  jointly	  switch	  to	  the	  Wood/Straight	  sub-­‐space.	  	  In	   the	   baseline	  model,	   as	   illustrated	   in	   Figure	   4,	   the	   agents	   switch	   to	   the	   sub-­‐space	  with	   the	   highest	   perceived	   payoff,	   conditional	   on	   their	  mental	  model.	   In	   other	  specifications,	   we	   relax	   this	   assumption	   by	   allowing	   the	   agents	   to	   explore,	   i.e.	  sometimes	  they	  investigate	  sub-­‐spaces	  that	  are	  not	  the	  most	  attractive	  as	  they	  currently	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see	   them.	   The	   higher	   the	   exploration	   parameter,	   the	   more	   the	   agents	   choose	   to	  investigate	  spaces	  at	  random	  without	  regard	  to	  their	  immediate	  attractiveness.6	  This	  is	  implemented	  using	  a	  Softmax	  algorithm.7	  The	  temperature	  in	  the	  Softmax	  algorithm	  is	  the	  exploration	  parameter	  –	  it	  determines	  the	  probability	  with	  which	  the	  agent	  chooses	  an	  alternative	  that	  is	  not	  immediately	  payoff-­‐maximizing.	  	  
Step	   2:	   Sample	   from	   chosen	   sub-­‐space:	   When	   both	   agents	   switch	   to	   their	  chosen	   sub-­‐space,	   they	   sample	   a	   combination	   from	  within	   that	   sub-­‐space.	   Since	   each	  alternative	  the	  agent	  is	  aware	  of	  (e.g.,	  wood)	  contains	  multiple	  latent	  coordinates	  (e.g.,	  oak,	  pine,	   cherry,	  etc.),	   sampling	   is	  achieved	  by	  placing	   the	  agent	  at	   random	  in	  one	  of	  these	  latent	  coordinates	  (e.g.,	  oak	  for	  the	  row	  agent	  and	  a	  specific	  shape	  for	  the	  column	  agent;	  see	  Figure	  4).	  Since	  agents	  do	  not	  have	  any	  knowledge	  of	  the	  specific	  coordinates	  that	  make	  up	  a	  sub-­‐space,	  they	  have	  no	  control	  of	  their	  actual	  location	  within	  the	  chosen	  (coarse-­‐grained)	  search	  space.	  	  
Step	   3:	   Is	   current	   payoff	   in-­‐line	  with	   agent	   expectation:	  With	   sampling,	   the	  agents	   become	   aware	   of	   the	  payoff	   to	   their	   joint	   solution.	   Each	   combination	  within	   a	  given	  coarse	  partition	  maps	  onto	  a	  particular	  payoff.	  Unlike	  game	  theoretic	  models,	  our	  agents	  have	   less	   than	  perfect	  knowledge	  of	  any	  given	  sub-­‐space,	  and	   the	  payoffs	   they	  expect	  may	  be	  different	   from	  the	  payoff	   they	  receive	   from	  the	  particular	  combination	  they	  sample.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  expectation	  is	  the	  average	  of	  the	  payoffs	  of	  all	  the	  latent	  choices	  within	   that	   sub-­‐space.	   For	   example,	   in	  Figure	  4,	   the	   agent	   expects	   a	  payoff	   of	  3.125,	  but	  the	  specific	  payoff	  they	  actually	  receive	  is	  zero.	  	  
Step	  3a:	  If	  payoff	  is	  NOT	  in	  line	  with	  expectation	  –	  DIG	  in	  current	  subspace	  to	  
understand	   it	   better:	   The	   agents	   realize	   that	   any	   significant	   mismatch	   between	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This implements the typical strategy for modeling exploration in individual search models. We systematically 
vary this exploration parameter to understand the effect of individual exploration on joint search outcomes. 
7 The Appendix provides further (mathematical) details on the mechanics of the model. 
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expected	  and	  received	  payoff	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  their	  imperfect	  knowledge	  of	  the	  sub-­‐space,	  which	  they	  then	  try	  to	  improve.	  We	  refer	  to	  the	  agent’s	  propensity	  to	  gain	  further	  fine-­‐grained	  partitions	  (sharper	  vision)	  in	  the	  chosen	  sub-­‐space	  as	  DIG.8	  DIG	  implies	  the	  agent	   expends	   effort	   in	   uncovering	   new	   knowledge	   such	   as	   by	   thinking	   about	   the	  problem,	  reading	  about	  it,	  talking	  to	  others	  etc.	  Increased	  fine-­‐graining	  allows	  the	  agent	  to	  distinguish	  between	  more	  nuanced	  categories.	  The	  idea	  is	  similar	  to	  Simon’s	  (1962)	  conception	  of	  choice	  set	  expansion	  or	  refinement	  of	  the	  search	  tree.	  	  In	  our	  model,	  when	  an	  agent	  decides	  to	  DIG,	  a	  new	  knowledge	  partition	  occurs	  in	  the	  agent’s	  mental	  model.	  In	  the	  windmill	  example,	  if	  the	  row	  agent	  decides	  to	  invest	  in	  understanding	   the	   sub-­‐space	   ‘Wood’	   more	   minutely,	   the	   sub-­‐space	   splits	   into	   hard-­‐wood	   and	   soft-­‐wood	   (see	   Figure	   5).	   The	   increased	   partitions	   imply	   that	   the	   agent’s	  mental	  model	  of	  the	  sub-­‐space	  is	  now	  more	  fine-­‐grained	  in	  the	  row	  dimension;	  in	  Figure	  5,	  it	  now	  sees	  four	  average	  payoff	  values	  where	  before	  it	  only	  perceived	  two.	  Similarly,	  when	  the	  column	  agent	  DIGs,	  the	  column	  dimension	  splits	  into	  two.	  Note	  that	  the	  new	  partition	  uncovered	  by	  the	  row	  agent	  is	  not	  visible	  to	  the	  column	  agent	  and	  vice-­‐versa.	  Over	   time,	   as	   the	   agents	   become	   aware	   of	  more	   partitions	   in	   the	   search	   space,	   their	  mental	  models	  increasingly	  diverge,	  unless	  the	  agents	  take	  specific	  steps	  to	  align	  them.	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  FIGURE	  5	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  To	  preserve	  bounded	  rationality	  and	  the	  logic	  of	  discovery	  in	  our	  model,	  we	  have	  imposed	   the	   following	   restrictions	   on	   the	  way	   digging	   leads	   to	   refinement	   of	  mental	  maps.	   In	   the	   base-­‐line	  model	   each	   dig	   operation	   splits	   a	   sub-­‐space	   in	   two	   along	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In the baseline model, we implement a surprise driven search function (Cohen and Axelrod, 1982). In 
robustness checks, we implement a version of the model where the agent digs only when their payoff is less 
than their aspiration level, based on the aspiration level model (March, 1988). Our results are qualitatively 
unchanged.  
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agent’s	  specialist	  dimension	  (row	  agent	  fine-­‐grains	  in	  row,	  column	  agent	  fine-­‐grains	  in	  column).	  The	  exact	  point	  where	  the	  split	  occurs	  in	  the	  sub-­‐space	  is	  chosen	  at	  random,	  since	   the	   agent	   has	   no	   prior	   access	   to	   the	   latent	   choices	   within	   that	   subspace.	   Also,	  agents	   do	   not	   know	   when	   they	   have	   reached	   maximum	   fine-­‐graining.	   When	   this	   is	  achieved,	  the	  agent	  may	  DIG,	  but	  does	  not	  become	  aware	  of	  any	  new	  partitions.	  	  
Step	  3b:	   If	   payoff	   is	   in	   line	  with	   expectation	   –move	  back	   to	   step	  1:	   If	   actual	  payoff	  meets	  expectations,	  the	  agent	  does	  not	  expend	  effort	  in	  further	  fine-­‐graining	  the	  sub-­‐space,	   but	   simply	   searches	   again;	   i.e.,	   they	   move	   back	   to	   step	   1.	   In	   the	   baseline	  model,	   under	   this	   condition,	   the	   agent	   samples	   again	   in	   the	   current	   sub-­‐space.	  Resampling	   is	  accomplished	  by	  placing	   the	  agent	   in	  a	  random	  combination	  within	   the	  current	   subspace	   (as	   explained	   in	   step	   2	   above).9	  In	   the	   baseline	   model,	   the	   agents	  effectively	  stop	  digging	  when	  their	  expected	  payoff	  is	  equal	  to	  what	  they	  actually	  receive,	  which	  happens	  only	  if	  they	  have	  identified	  the	  precise	  sub-­‐space	  that	  contains	  the	  peak.	  This	   implies	  the	  agent	  has	  achieved	  perfect	  granularity	   in	  that	  sub-­‐space;	  however,	   it	   is	  unlikely	   that	   they	   have	   maximal	   granularity	   in	   any	   other	   region	   of	   the	   landscape.	   An	  alternative	  assumption	  to	  the	  baseline	  is	  that	  if	  received	  payoff	  exceeds	  expected	  payoff,	  the	  agent	  decides	  not	  to	  search	  any	  further.	  We	  examine	  this	  alternative	  and	  find	  that	  our	  results	  are	  robust	  to	  this	  assumption.	  	  
Step	   4:	   Recalculate	   payoffs	   to	   all	   subspaces	   currently	   visible:	   The	   agent	  recalculates	   expected	   payoffs	   for	   all	   known	   choices.	   If	   the	   dig	   operation	   in	   step	   3a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Further sampling randomly repositions the agents within a subspace because agents who locate in a subspace 
have no knowledge about the underlying latent combinations. The agent is limited by its current granularity, and 
consequently has no control over positioning within the chosen subspace. We can think of this as if the agents 
are performing experiments, but since experimental noise is not entirely eliminated (imperfect granularity), they 
get different results every time. Random repositioning allows the agent to continue search – if it happens to 
locate in a combination whose payoff is different enough from what is expected, the agent ‘digs’ and is 
rewarded with more knowledge (more precision). This procedure implements behavior that is consistent with 
the knowledge conditions we impute to agents. In principle, an agent cannot choose to stick to a particular point 
within a subspace unless the agent can actually see that point. But “seeing that point” would mean that the agent 
had much finer granularity (a subspace is just another term for a knowledge partition). 
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results	  in	  new	  partitions,	  the	  agent	  now	  has	  more	  choices	  available,	  and	  consequently,	  the	  payoffs	   imputed	   to	   these	  choices	  by	   the	  agent	  have	  also	  grown	  more	  accurate	   (as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  5).	  	  At	   this	   point,	   the	   agent	   retraces	   the	   sequence	   of	   steps	   from	   step	   1.	   The	  simulation	  ends	  after	  500	  discrete	  time	  steps.	  The	  value	  of	  500	  time	  steps	  was	  chosen	  because	  it	  ensures	  that	  all	  simulations	  had	  approached	  a	  steady	  state.10	  
Organizing	  Joint	  Search	  In	   unitary	   search,	   one	   agent	   searches	   in	   both	   dimensions,	   and	   therefore	  automatically	  has	  fully	  aligned	  mental	  maps,	  as	  well	  as	  aligned	  actions.	  In	  joint	  search,	  however,	   there	  is	  division	  of	   labor,	  and	  the	  DIG	  operation	  leads	  to	  asymmetric	  mental	  models	  between	  these	  interdependent	  agents.	  In	  order	  to	  coordinate,	  the	  agents	  need	  to	  align	  their	  mental	  models.	  Different	  organization	  designs	  engender	  different	  patterns	  of	  interaction	   among	   the	   specialists,	   which	   determines	   the	   rate	   and	   the	   level	   of	  mental	  model	   alignment	   over	   time.	   This,	   in	   turn,	   affects	   agents’	   subsequent	   search	   locations	  (Denrell	   and	   March,	   2001).	   We	   have	   adopted	   three	   of	   the	   integration	   conditions	   –	  autonomous,	   top-­‐down	  and	  coordination	  –	  proposed	  by	  Gavetti	   (2005)	   to	  understand	  their	   effects	   on	   coordinated	   exploration.	  11 	  In	   all	   these	   conditions,	   the	   row	   agent	  determines	   the	   row	   position	   and	   the	   column	   agent	   the	   column	   position	   in	   each	   time	  step.	  The	  agents	  switch	  to	  the	  portion	  of	  the	  matrix	  identified	  by	  their	  joint	  choice.	  	  
Autonomous:	  The	  key	  to	  this	  design	   is	   that	   the	  agents	  search	   in	  parallel,	  but	  do	  not	  make	  any	  attempt	  to	  align	  their	  mental	  models.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 We applied difference tests to the values of behavioral variables as well as obtained payoffs. When these tests 
approach constant values for differences between successive time-steps, the dynamics approaches steady state. 
11 The fourth type of integration mechanism proposed by Gavetti (2005), “circulation of cognition” is not very 
meaningful in our setting since it involves complete transfer of knowledge from one agent to another at some 
point in time. 
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Top-­‐Down:	   In	   this	   case,	  we	   consider	   the	   situation	  where	   two	   agents	   search	   in	  parallel,	  and	  where	  senior	  management	  attempts	  to	  achieve	  coordination	  by	  imposing	  the	  same	  mental	  model	  on	  both	  the	  agents;	  i.e.,	  at	  t=0,	  both	  agents	  have	  identical	  (fully	  aligned)	  partitions	  of	  the	  search	  space.	  This	  ensures	  that	  both	  agents	  identify	  the	  same	  region	  in	  the	  landscape	  as	  attractive	  and	  concentrate	  their	  search	  efforts	  in	  that	  region.	  After	  this	  initial	  alignment,	  search	  is	  identical	  to	  the	  autonomous	  regime.	  Note	  that	  the	  initial	   partitioning	   is	   fairly	   limited	   and	   made	   at	   random.	   This	   regime	   allows	   us	   to	  understand	  how	  initial	  shared	  knowledge	  impacts	  joint	  search.	  	  
Coordination:	  In	  this	  case,	  we	  consider	  the	  situation	  where	  two	  agents	  search	  in	  parallel,	   but	   make	   some	   attempt	   to	   align	   their	   mental	   maps	   of	   the	   search	   space.	  Coordination	  is	  an	  attempt	  by	  one	  agent	  to	  understand	  the	  world	  “precisely”	  as	  viewed	  by	   the	   other	   agent.	   In	   this	   condition,	   agents	   attempt	   to	   partition	   the	   search	   space	   in	  
identical	  divisions	  by	  communicating	  their	  knowledge	  partitions	  to	  each	  other.	  	  Coordination	   is	   modeled	   as	   follows:	   The	   row	   (column)	   agent	   requests	   the	  column	   (row)	  agent	   for	  new	  knowledge	   regarding	   the	   column	   (row)	  dimension.	  With	  each	  request,	   the	  column	  (row)	  agent	  provides	   the	  row	  (column)	  agent	  with	  one	  new	  column	  (row)	  partition	  that	  the	  row	  (column)	  agent	  does	  not	  already	  know.12	  The	  more	  frequent	  these	  requests,	  the	  more	  aligned	  the	  knowledge	  partitions	  become.	  However,	  there	   is	   an	   (opportunity)	   cost	   to	   communication.	   Since	   gaining	   new	   knowledge,	   by	  digging	  or	  by	  communicating,	  is	  an	  effortful	  accomplishment,	  each	  time	  period	  an	  agent	  requests	  the	  other	  agent	  for	  information,	  the	  requesting	  agent	  forgoes	  the	  opportunity	  to	  further	  improve	  the	  granularity	  in	  its	  own	  dimension	  in	  that	  time	  period.	  That	  is,	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Empirically communication between specialists is very difficult, and knowledge does not easily transcend the 
different ‘thought worlds’ that these specialists occupy (Dougherty, 1992; Iansiti, 1995). Therefore we have 
restricted communication to provide the agent with only one new knowledge partition. If agents communicate 
every partition they know about every time they communicate, they are no longer specialists! If this were 
possible, mental models will be fully aligned, and the problem of coordinated exploration will not exist.  
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agent	  can	  only	  improve	  the	  granularity	  in	  one	  dimension	  at	  a	  time.13	  The	  frequency	  of	  communication	  is	  a	  parameter	  in	  the	  model	  and	  does	  not	  change	  with	  time.	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   in	   this	   set-­‐up,	   we	   assume	   that	   communication	  effectively	  increases	  alignment	  of	  mental	  maps.	  By	  assumption,	  there	  is	  no	  fundamental	  incongruence	  between	  agents’	  mental	  maps	   -­‐-­‐	  differences	  between	  the	  granularities	  of	  the	   two	   actors’	   knowledge	   partitions	   are	   the	   only	   source	   of	   misalignment.	   With	  infrequent	   communication,	   coordination	  approaches	   the	  autonomous	   case,	  whereas	   it	  approaches	   the	   opposite,	   fully	   shared	   knowledge	   structures	   with	   increasing	  communication.14	  	  
FINDINGS	  Tables	   2-­‐4	   summarize	   the	   final	   payoffs	   received	   by	   the	   agents	   in	   the	   different	  treatment	   conditions	   in	   this	   simulation	  model	  while	   searching	   the	   2-­‐peaks	   landscape	  (as	   shown	   in	   Figure	   1).	   In	   general,	   the	   findings	   are	   consistent	   with	   the	   alternative	  hypotheses	  (H1b,	  H2b,	  H3b)	  argued	  for	  in	  the	  theory	  section.	  	  
1.	  Agents	  with	  low	  (non-­‐zero)	  level	  of	  communication	  perform	  better	  than	  agents	  
with	   high	   levels	   of	   communication:	   From	   table	   2,	   we	   see	   that	   frequency	   of	  communication	   has	   a	   non-­‐monotonic	   relationship	   with	   search	   outcomes.	   No	  communication	  between	  the	  agents	  (autonomous	  search)	  results	  in	  very	  poor	  outcomes	  (payoff	  of	  0.70),	  communicating	  only	  once	  in	  20	  rounds	  results	  in	  quite	  good	  outcomes	  (payoff	   of	   0.97).	   However,	   communicating	   very	   frequently,	   i.e.	   once	   in	   two	   rounds	  results	   in	   comparatively	   poorer	   outcomes	   (payoff	   of	   0.91).	   This	   pattern	   of	   results	   is	  consistent	  with	  H2b.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In robustness checks we relax this assumption and find that it does not qualitatively change our results.  
14 We only model perfect communication. The degree to which mental maps overlap is strictly governed by 
frequency of communication. The autonomous case, which we do model, logically approximates imperfect 
communication. 
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We	   find	   this	   pattern	   because	   too	   much	   communication	   leads	   agents	   to	   joint	  myopia,	  i.e.,	  a	  pre-­‐mature	  focus	  on	  local	  peaks.	  As	  we	  argued	  in	  the	  theory	  section,	  there	  is	  a	  trade-­‐off	  between	  search	  and	  coordination.	  The	  more	  the	  mental	  maps	  are	  aligned,	  the	  more	   the	  agents	   influence	  each	  other	   in	  concentrating	  on	  a	  narrow	  portion	  of	   the	  landscape	   that	   both	   see	   as	   beneficial	   –	   but	   at	   the	   necessary	   cost	   of	   blurred	   vision	  regarding	   other	   regions	   in	   the	   landscape.	   This	   occurs	   because	   communication	  influences	   the	   region	   in	   which	   sharper	   vision	   is	   achieved,	   since	   it	   regulates	   where	  knowledge	   partitions	   are	   increased.	   Therefore,	   once	   a	   promising	   region	   is	   jointly	  identified,	   the	   agents	   concentrate	   on	   increasing	   their	   knowledge	   of	   that	   specific	   sub-­‐region	  and	  neglect	  exploration.	  Pre-­‐mature	   focus	   is	   a	   powerful	   detriment	   to	   search	   –	   it	   prevents	   agents	   from	  exploring	  the	  high	  value	  region,	  which	  is	  a	  natural	  attractor.	  Figure	  6	  shows	  the	  search	  pattern	  of	  specialist	  agents	  in	  the	  two	  spike	  landscape	  –	  the	  left	  column	  for	  agents	  who	  communicate	   once	   in	  20	   rounds;	   the	   right	   column	   for	   agents	  who	   communicate	   once	  every	   two	   rounds.	   As	   the	   granularity	   figures	   show	   (Fig	   6,	   mid-­‐row),	   in	   the	   low	  communication	   case,	   the	   agents	   quickly	   identify	   an	   interesting	   region	   from	   their	  own	  
view-­‐point	   and	   then	   slowly	   try	   to	  understand	   the	   space	   from	   the	  other	  point	   of	   view.	  This	  enables	  them	  to	  explore	  effectively	  –	  their	  probability	  of	  digging	  is	  above	  zero	  even	  after	  250	  time	  steps	  (Fig	  6,	  left	  figure	  in	  lower-­‐row).	  The	  high	  communication	  condition	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  stifles	  exploration	  and	  agents	  converge	  very	  quickly	  –	  the	  probability	  of	  digging	  falls	  to	  almost	  zero	  within	  50	  time	  steps	  (Fig	  6,	  right	  figure	  in	  lower-­‐row).	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  INSERT	  TABLE	  2,	  TABLE	  3,	  TABLE	  4,	  FIGURE	  6	  HERE	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	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2.	   T-­‐shaped	   skills	   are	   useful	   for	   unitary	   search	  but	   problematic	  when	  agents	   are	  
interdependent:	   Table	   3	   shows	   the	   average	   payoff	   of	   an	   unitary	   searcher	   who	   is	   a	  specialist;	   i.e.,	   increases	  granularity	   in	  only	  one	  dimension	  vs.	  an	  agent	  with	  T-­‐shaped	  skills	  who	  increases	  granularity	  in	  both	  dimensions.	  As	  expected,	  the	  agent	  with	  the	  T-­‐shaped	  skills	  performs	  much	  better.	  Whereas	   the	  specialist	  agent	  achieves	  a	  payoff	  of	  0.01,	  an	  agent	  with	  T-­‐shaped	  skills	  achieves	  a	  payoff	  of	  0.90;	  i.e.	  on	  average,	  80%	  of	  the	  agents	  identify	  the	  high	  peak	  (=1.00)	  and	  20%	  of	  agents	  identify	  the	  low	  peak	  (=0.50).	  In	   Figure	   7	   (panel-­‐A),	   which	   shows	   the	   location	   of	   agents	   over	   time,	   we	   see	   that	   no	  agent	  with	  T-­‐shaped	  skills	  has	  a	  final	  payoff	  of	  zero;	  they	  reliably	  identify	  one	  of	  the	  two	  valuable	  peaks.15	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  INSERT	  FIGURE	  7	  HERE	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  We	   next	   turn	   our	   attention	   to	   coordinated	   exploration	   achieved	   by	   teams	   of	  agents.	   First,	  we	   examine	   the	   case	   of	   specialists.	   As	   expected,	  we	   see	   in	   Table	   3	   that	  when	  autonomous,	  i.e.,	  they	  make	  no	  effort	  to	  align	  their	  mental	  models,	  their	  payoff	  of	  (0.70)	  is	  higher	  than	  the	  unitary	  specialist	  searcher,	  but	  lower	  than	  the	  unitary	  searcher	  with	   T-­‐shaped	   skills.	   From	   Figure	   7	   (panel-­‐B),	   we	   see	   that	   several	   agents	   achieve	   a	  payoff	   of	   zero,	   because	   one	   agent	   focuses	   on	   the	   tall	   peak	   whereas	   the	   other	   agent	  focuses	  on	  the	  short	  peak;	  they	  confuse	  each	  other,	  and	  jointly	   land	  on	  a	  solution	  that	  has	  zero	  value.	  This	   evidence	   is	   consistent	  with	   our	   argument	   that	   agents	   in	   coupled	   learning	  problems	  are	  subject	  to	  mutual-­‐confusion,	  a	  condition	  that	  allows	  agents	  to	  persist	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  An individual searcher need not be equally good in both dimensions. In robustness, we find that a searcher 
who partitions in the other dimension approximately only once every twenty rounds achieves approximately the 
same final payoff as one who partitions in the other dimension once every two rounds.	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a	   flawed	   mental	   model	   of	   the	   search	   space.	   It	   is	   worthwhile	   to	   note	   that	   in	   this	  condition,	   at	   steady	  state,	   the	  dig	  probability	  of	   the	  average	   specialist	   agent	   is	   almost	  0.9;	   i.e.,	   the	   agents	   are	   still	   attempting	   to	   find	   the	   valuable	   combination	   despite	   the	  negative	   feedback.	  Such	  confounding	   is	   impossible	   in	   search	  by	  a	  unitary	  agent.	  Since	  agents	   do	   not	   realize	  when	   the	  maximum	   level	   of	   granularity	   is	   reached,	   they	   try	   to	  continually	  tweak	  their	  experiments	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  finding	  better	  solutions.16 	  Our	   argument	   in	   hypothesis	   2b	   is	   that	   agents	   with	   T-­‐shaped	   skills,	   though	  possessing	   superior	  knowledge	  of	   the	   landscape	  are	   still	   subject	   to	  mutual	   confusion.	  From	  Table	  3,	  we	   see	   that	   their	   performance,	  with	   a	   payoff	   of	   0.60	   is	  worse	   than	   the	  autonomous	  specialist	  searchers.	  This	  finding	  demonstrates	  the	  challenge	  of	  epistemic	  interdependence	  in	  coordinated	  exploration.	  Since	  these	  two	  agents	  do	  not	  have	  aligned	  knowledge	  partitions,	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  make	  choices	  that	  are	   jointly	  valuable.	  These	  poor	  results	  are	  obtained	  despite	  that	  fact	  that	  at	  steady	  state,	  the	  two	  agents,	  each	  have	  almost	  as	  fine-­‐grained	  partitions	  of	  the	  search	  space	  (average	  of	  8.4x8.4)	  as	  the	  unitary	  searcher	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  simulation	  (8.6x8.4).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  agents	  achieve	  very	  poor	  outcomes	   in	   joint	  search	  even	  though	  each	  agent	   is	  equipped	  with	  a	  set	  of	   traits	  that	  give	  them	  the	  same	  potential	  to	  acquire	  knowledge	  as	  the	  individual	  searcher.	  This	  result	   is	   an	   interesting	   contrast	   to	   joint	   search	   models	   without	   epistemic	  interdependence.	  In	  prior	  work,	  joint	  searchers	  reach	  good	  solutions	  if	  they	  both	  have	  very	   good	   processing	   power	   (i.e.,	   power	   to	   consider	   also	   the	   complementary	  dimension)	   as	   long	   as	   they	   do	   not	   pre-­‐maturely	   weed	   out	   solutions	   (Rivkin	   and	  Siggelkow,	  2003;	  Siggelkow	  and	  Rivkin,	  2006).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Situations where agents continue to invest effort without realizing that a search region is useless are fairly 
common. Examples include the astronomers who spent their lives tweaking the geo-centric model of the 
universe or the chemists who based their experiments on the phlogiston theory. Perhaps, the most famous 
example is Pasteur who tried to create a vaccine for rabies by using blood samples from infected animals; an 
ultimately fruitless quest since the rabies virus did not travel by blood like anthrax and the other pathogens he 
had worked with previously. 
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Hierarchy	  as	  a	  coordination	  device:	  This	  problem	  of	  mutual	  confusion	  in	  coupled	  learning	  problems	  should	  reduce	  when	  agents	  are	  provided	  with	  a	  coordination	  device,	  i.e.,	  some	  ability	  to	  align	  their	  mental	  models	  of	  the	  search	  space.	  Communication	  is	  one	  means	  of	  aligning	  mental	  models,	  as	  discussed	  earlier.	  Another	  is	  hierarchy,	  which	  may	  impose	  identical	  mental	  models	  on	  the	  agents.	  	  	  We	   implemented	  hierarchy	   following	   the	   top-­‐down	  model	  proposed	  by	  Gavetti	  (2005)	  by	  providing	  two	  specialist	  agents	  with	  identical	  partitions	  in	  both	  dimensions	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	   search,	  but	   search	  autonomously.	  From	   table	  4,	  we	  see	   that	  when	  these	  agents	  are	  provided	  with	  an	  8x8	  partition	  space,	  they	  are	  able	  to	  achieve	  a	  payoff	  of	  0.85,	  which	  is	  closer	  to	  the	  payoff	  achieved	  by	  the	  unitary	  searcher	  (0.90),	  and	  higher	  than	  the	  payoffs	  for	  two	  autonomous	  specialist	  searchers	  (0.70).	  The	  initial	  vision	  of	  the	  sub-­‐space	   in	   this	   case	   is	   sufficiently	   fine-­‐grained	   for	   both	   the	   autonomous	   agents	   to	  target	   the	   same	  peak	   and	   consequently	   the	   agents	   are	   less	   likely	   to	  mutually	   confuse	  each	  other.	  Similar	  results	  are	  achieved	  also	  for	  the	  agents	  with	  T-­‐shaped	  skills.	  	  This	  shows	  that	  integration	  mechanisms	  that	  rely	  on	  setting	  up	  an	  initial	  shared	  frame	  of	   reference,	   such	  as	   common	  culture	  or	   common	  processes	   can	  be	   a	  powerful	  coordinating	   mechanism	   even	   under	   conditions	   of	   uncertainty.	   This	   finding	   is	  inconsistent	  with	  some	  of	  the	  earlier	  work	  that	  suggests	  that	  only	  feedback	  is	  useful	  for	  coordinating	  in	  situations	  of	  uncertainty	  (Galbraith,	  1977;	  Tushman	  and	  Nadler,	  1978),	  but	   consistent	   with	  more	   recent	   work	   that	   suggests	   that	   shared	   frames	   of	   reference	  help	   in	   coordinating	   by	   increasing	   predictability	   of	   actions	   (Puranam	   et	   al,	   2012;	  Srikanth	  and	  Puranam,	  2011;	  Okhuysen	  and	  Bechky,	  2009).	  
3.	   Impact	  of	   exploration	  on	  unitary	   search	  vs.	   coordinated	  exploration:	   An	   agent	  explores	  when	  it	  chooses	  actions	  without	  regard	  for	  its	  immediate	  payoff.	  In	  our	  model,	  we	   investigate	   the	   impact	   of	   exploration,	   by	   varying	   the	   curiosity	   parameter	   ‘τ’.	   As	   τ	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increases,	  the	  more	  likely	  the	  agent	  switches	  between	  sub-­‐spaces	  without	  regard	  to	  the	  immediate	  expected	  payoff	  from	  that	  sub-­‐space.	  The	  first	  result	  we	  observe	  is	  that	  τ=0	  outperforms	  τ>0	  across	  all	  conditions;	  the	  higher	   the	   curiosity	   (τ),	   the	   worse	   the	   performance.	   Whereas	   the	   unitary	   searcher	  suffers	  relatively	  less	  than	  the	  joint	  searchers	  for	  all	  values	  of	  τ	  tested,	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  autonomous	  specialists	  is	  reduced	  the	  most.	  The	  results	  further	  suggest	  that	  the	  negative	   consequences	   of	   increasing	   mutual	   confusion	   dominate	   the	   slow	   learning	  effect	   as	   agents’	   curiosity	   increases	   (starting	   from	   low	   values	   of	   τ).	   Our	   results	   also	  support	   our	   intuition	   that	   increasing	   alignment	   of	  mental	  models	   should	   help	   reduce	  mutual	   confusion.	   As	   agents	   increase	   exploration,	   the	   top-­‐down	   condition	   performs	  better	   than	   the	  autonomous	   condition,	   and	  agents	   that	   communicate	  more	   frequently	  outperform	   those	   that	   communicate	   less	   often.	   These	   results	   are	   consistent	  with	   our	  argument	  in	  hypothesis	  H3b,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  2-­‐spike	  landscape.	  
Robustness	  Checks	  We	  performed	  a	  number	  of	  checks	  to	  assess	  the	  robustness	  of	  the	  findings	  to	  our	  assumptions	   and	   to	   clarify	   the	   underlying	   mechanisms.	   Specifically,	   we	   checked	   our	  results	   for	   (1)	   different	   types	   of	   landscapes,	   (2)	   different	   initial	   conditions	   and	   (3)	  different	   search	   algorithms.	   These	   robustness	   checks	   in	   general	   strengthen	   our	  intuition	  regarding	  the	  above	  results.	  	  	  
1.	  Different	  landscapes:	  Even	  if	  we	  explained	  our	  main	  results	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  2-­‐spikes	  landscape	  (figure	  1),	  we	  did	  test	  our	  results	  with	  other	  landscapes	  shown	  in	   Figure	   8	   as	   well	   as	   with	   a	   few	   randomly	   generated	   landscapes.	   The	   random	  landscapes	   involved	   few	   (5)	   or	  many	   (30)	   combinations	  with	   non-­‐zero	   value,	   placed	  randomly	  in	  the	  landscape.	  In	  these	  landscapes,	  the	  global	  peak	  was	  set	  to	  a	  value	  of	  1	  and	   other	   peaks	  were	   drawn	   from	   a	   uniform	   distribution	   between	   0	   and	   1.	  We	   also	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generated	  a	  landscape	  with	  multiple	  peaks	  with	  a	  gradient	  that	  allows	  for	  hill	  climbing,	  a	  property	  that	  is	  not	  clearly	  present	  in	  any	  of	  the	  spiked	  landscapes.	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  INSERT	  FIGURE	  8	  HERE	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  In	   the	  single	  spike	   landscape	  (figure	  8,	  panel	  C),	  autonomous	  searchers	  always	  find	   the	  global	  peak.	  For	  profit	   seeking	  agents,	   the	  one	   spike	  acts	   as	   an	  unambiguous	  attractor	  as	  they	  fine-­‐grain	  their	  mental-­‐models.	  As	  each	  agent	  chooses	  a	  good	  solution	  for	  itself,	  the	  two	  agents	  jointly	  land	  on	  the	  valuable	  combination.	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  2-­‐spike	  landscape,	  where	  coordination	  is	  important	  because	  the	  shorter	  peak	  is	  an	  alternative	  attractor	  that	  confuses	  the	  agents	  with	  incongruent	  mental	  models.	  	  The	   ridge	   landscape	   (figure	   8,	   panel	  D)	   has	   several	   equally	   valuable	   solutions,	  and	   consequently	   emphasizes	   coordination	   over	   search	   when	   compared	   with	   the	   2-­‐spike	  landscape.	  In	  the	  ridge	  landscape,	  autonomous	  search	  leads	  to	  an	  average	  payoff	  of	  0.03-­‐0.04,	  which	  is	  about	  the	  same	  as	  the	  randomizing	  payoff	  expected	  in	  a	  matching	  game	  over	  this	  sub-­‐space.	  In	  the	  top-­‐down	  case,	  our	  intuition	  suggests	  that	  performance	  should	   improve	  because	   the	   initial	  alignment	   in	  partitioning	   the	  search	  space	  reduces	  the	   number	   of	   confusing	   peaks	   and	   thereby	   improves	   coordination.	   In	   line	   with	   this	  expectation,	   the	   payoff	   for	   the	   ridge-­‐landscape	   increases	   to	   0.38.	   In	   the	   coordination	  condition	  we	   find	   that	  agents	  who	  communicate	  more	   frequently	  perform	  better	   than	  the	  agents	  who	  communicate	  infrequently.	  This	  result	  is	  different	  from	  the	  2-­‐peak	  case,	  because	   here	   there	   is	   no	   need	   to	   search	   for	   a	   tall	   peak,	   since	   all	   peaks	   are	   of	   equal	  height.	   Therefore,	   coordination	   is	   the	   only	   problem	   the	   agents	   face,	   and	   as	   expected,	  higher	  levels	  of	  communication	  lead	  to	  better	  coordination.	  Here,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  search	  imperative,	  the	  prediction	  from	  the	  information	  processing	  theory	  (H1a)	  holds.	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The	  ridge-­‐peak	  landscape	  (Figure	  8,	  panel	  B)	  lies	  in	  between	  the	  ridge	  and	  the	  2-­‐spikes	  landscapes.	  It	  simultaneously	  taxes	  search	  and	  coordination;	  the	  higher	  peaks	  act	  as	  attractors	  towards	  that	  region	  in	  the	  landscape,	  but	  since	  there	  are	  several	  of	  them	  close	  to	  each	  other,	  coordination	  becomes	  that	  much	  more	  important.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	   optimal	   level	   of	   communication	   should	   lie	   in-­‐between	   the	   2-­‐peak	   and	   the	   ridge	  landscape.	  Our	  results	  confirm	  this	  intuition.	  Also,	  similar	  to	  the	  ridge	  case,	  in	  the	  top-­‐down	  condition,	  we	  find	  that	  higher	  the	  initial	  granularity,	  the	  higher	  the	  performance.	  	  The	  random	  landscapes	  generated	  with	  5	  and	  30	  peaks	  respectively	  also	  provide	  evidence	   in	   support	   of	   the	   same	   intuition.	   As	   the	   number	   of	   peaks	   increases,	   the	  increasing	   number	   of	   possible	   combinations	   challenges	   coordination.	   As	   coordination	  becomes	  more	   challenging,	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   autonomous	   agents	   declines.	   This	  effect	  can	  be	  countered	  by	  tighter	  alignment	  of	  mental	  models,	  but	  only	  to	  some	  extent,	  because	  even	  if	  coordination	  helps	  agents	  in	  jointly	  targeting	  some	  peak,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  the	  global	  peak.	  We	  obtain	  similar	  results	  for	  the	  multi-­‐peak	  landscape	  as	  well.	  17	  	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  the	  balance	  between	  H1a	  and	  H1b	  is	  likely	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  emphasis	  the	  landscape	  lays	  on	  search	  vs.	  coordination	  for	  successful	  outcomes.	  In	   landscapes	   that	   emphasize	   search,	   a	   lower	   level	   of	   communication	   is	   better.	   In	  contrast,	   in	   landscapes	   that	   emphasize	   coordination,	   agents	   with	   higher	   levels	   of	  communication	  perform	  better.	  	  
2.	   Initial	   Conditions:	   We	   checked	   to	   see	   whether	   and	   how	   the	   agents'	   initial	  granularity	   of	   vision	   affects	   these	   results.	   Specifically,	   agents	   could	   be	   natural	   born	  specialists	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  already	  have	  a	  high	  level	  of	  granularity	  in	  their	  "own"	  dimension	  when	  they	  begin	  the	  search	  task.	  Obviously,	  altering	  the	  prior	  knowledge	  of	  the	  agents	  may	  impact	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  different	  coordination	  mechanisms.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 These results are available from the authors.  
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We	  experimented	  with	  initial	  granularities	  (own	  dimension,	  other	  dimension)	  of	  (2,	  1),	   (4,	  1),	   (8,	  1),	   (16,	  1)	  and	   (24,	  1)	   for	  each	  agent.	  An	  agent	  with	  very	  high	   initial	  granularity	  in	  their	  own	  dimension	  and	  very	  little	  in	  the	  other	  dimension	  is	  a	  specialist.	  	  In	   this	   condition,	   by	   definition	   the	   agents’	   initial	   granularities	   are	   misaligned.	   Our	  theory	   suggests	   that	   specialists	  who	   do	   not	   communicate	   adequately	   should	   perform	  worse	   than	   those	   that	   do	   communicate	   very	   often,	   since	   communication	   promotes	  alignment	   of	   mental	   models	   in	   coordinated	   exploration.	   The	   flip-­‐side	   of	   alignment,	  narrowing	   of	   search,	   perhaps	  may	  not	   pose	   as	   big	   a	   challenge	   for	   these	   agents,	   since	  high	  initial	  granularity	  implies	  an	  already	  superior	  understanding	  of	  the	  landscape	  from	  their	   own	   dimension.	   Our	   results	   support	   this	   intuition	   –	   agents	   with	   (24,1)	   initial	  granularity	  perform	  equally	  well	  under	  the	  high	  communication	  condition	  as	  under	  the	  low	   communication	   condition	   in	   the	   2-­‐spike	   landscape.	   In	   contrast,	   agents	  with	   (2,1)	  initial	  granularity,	  perform	  better	  when	  they	  have	  little,	  but	  non-­‐zero	  communication.	  	  
3.	  Different	  Search	  Algorithms:	   As	   a	   final	   robustness	   check	  we	   investigated	   the	  effect	  of	  a	  different	  search	  algorithm	  that	   regulates	   the	  DIG	  behavior	  of	   the	  agents.	   In	  the	  standard	  model,	  the	  agents	  are	  surprise-­‐driven:	  agents	  increase	  granularity	  if	  they	  receive	  a	  payoff	  that	  is	  different	  from	  what	  they	  expect	  (Cohen	  and	  Axelrod,	  1984).	  We	  also	  modeled	  a	   satisficing,	   aspiration	  driven	  model	  process,	  where	  agents	   continue	   to	  increase	  granularity	  until	  they	  achieve	  a	  pre-­‐specified	  threshold	  payoff	  (March,	  1988).	  We	  experimented	  with	  different	  thresholds,	  including	  0,	  0.25,	  0.50,	  0.75	  and	  1.0.	  If	  the	  threshold	  is	  zero,	  the	  agent	  does	  not	  search.	  If	  the	  threshold	  is	  1.0,	  the	  agent	  continues	  to	  search	  until	  they	  have	  identified	  the	  global	  peak.	  	  Our	   results	   for	   all	   the	   landscapes	   except	   the	   multi-­‐peak	   landscape	   are	  qualitatively	   similar	   to	   the	   base-­‐line	   model.	   Specifically,	   as	   long	   as	   the	   threshold	  specified	  is	  greater	  than	  zero,	  agents	  achieve	  approximately	  the	  same	  final	  payoff	  in	  this	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model	  as	  in	  the	  baseline	  model.	  However,	  in	  the	  multi-­‐peak	  landscape,	  agents	  perform	  better	   as	   the	   threshold	   increases.	   This	   is	   because,	   in	   this	   landscape,	   the	   peaks	   have	  gradients;	   increasing	   thresholds	   ensure	   that	   the	   agents	   continue	   to	   “hill-­‐climb”	   in	  pursuit	   of	   better	   performance.	   Our	   primary	   result	   that	   “too	  much	   communication”	   is	  worse	  than	  “limited	  communication”,	  also	  holds	  here	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  the	  “threshold”.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  our	  results	  are	  robust	  to	  changes	  in	  this	  assumption	  shows	  that	  the	  specific	  choice	  of	  stopping	  criterion	  does	  not	  transform	  or	  eliminate	  the	  core	  problem	  of	  coordinated	   exploration	   -­‐-­‐	   where	   updating	   of	   interdependent	   mental	   models	   and	  confounded	  feedback	  (arising	  from	  joint	  actions)	  challenges	  adaptive	  behavior.	  	  
IMPLICATIONS	  AND	  SUGGESTIONS	  FOR	  FUTURE	  WORK	  Organizations	  exist	  to	  manage	  the	  trade-­‐off	  that	  arises	  with	  the	  division	  of	  labor:	  benefits	  from	  increasing	  specialization	  vs.	  losses	  arising	  from	  the	  need	  for	  coordination.	  Coordinated	  exploration	  –	  the	  condition	  where	  specialist	  searchers	  need	  to	  coordinate	  their	   choices	   is	  a	   significant	  problem	   for	  organizations,	  but	   is	   inadequately	  addressed	  by	  prior	  work.	  Prior	  theories	  on	  coordination	  ignore	  search.	  In	  contrast	  prior	  work	  on	  organizational	   search	   has	   ignored	   the	   need	   for	   coordination;	   the	   bulk	   of	   this	   work	  characterizes	   the	   organization	   as	   a	   unitary	   actor	   (Cyert	   and	   March,	   1963;	   Levinthal,	  1997;	  Levinthal	  and	  March,	  1981).	  Neither	  of	  these	  approaches	  is	  helpful	  to	  understand	  coordinated	  exploration.	  	  Our	   contention	   is	   that	   predictions	   from	   prior	   theories	   are	   incorrect	   when	  applied	   to	   situations	  of	   coordinated	   exploration,	   because	   the	   simplifying	   assumptions	  used	  in	  prior	  work	  abstract	  away	  from	  the	  fundamental	  problem	  posed	  by	  the	  coupling	  of	   uncertainty	   and	   epistemic	   interdependence.	   Theories	   of	   coordination	   assume	   that	  the	   specialist	   agents	   have	   complete	   knowledge	   in	   their	   own	   search	   domains	   and	  recommend	   strategies	   that	   swiftly	   increase	   common	   ground	   to	   achieve	   high	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performance	   (Tushman	   and	  Nadler,	   1978;	   Galbraith,	   1977).	   They	   ignore	   the	   effect	   of	  increasing	   common	   ground	   on	   subsequent	   search,	   i.e.,	   increasing	   joint-­‐myopia	   that	  actually	   decreases	   performance	   in	   coordinated	   exploration.	   Similarly,	   theories	   of	  organizational	   search	   suggest	   that	   slow	   learning,	   which	   promotes	   moderate	  exploration,	   as	   important	   for	   achieving	   good	   search	   outcomes	   (Denrell	   and	   March,	  2001;	   Siggelkow	   and	   Levinthal,	   2003;	   Ethiraj	   and	   Levinthal,	   2004;	   Knudsen	   and	  Levinthal,	   2007;	   Fang,	   Lee	   and	   Schilling,	   2010).	   These	   theories	   ignore	   the	   effect	   of	  individual	   exploration	   on	   coordinating	   search,	   i.e.,	   increasing	   mutual-­‐confusion	   that	  again	  decreases	  performance	  in	  coordinated	  exploration.	  	  Managing	   the	   Scylla	   and	   Charybdis	   of	   mutual-­‐confusion	   vs.	   joint-­‐myopia	  distinguishes	  problems	  of	  coordinated	  exploration	  from	  problems	  of	  unitary	  search	  and	  from	   pure	   coordination	   problems.	   Mutual-­‐confusion	   arises	   because	   feedback	   to	  interdependent	  searchers	  confounds	  the	  consequences	  of	  their	  actions	  with	  the	  action	  of	  others,	  thereby	  preventing	  them	  from	  forming	  accurate	  mental	  models	  of	  the	  search	  space.	  Aligning	  mental	  models	  has	  the	  consequence	  of	  reducing	  mutual-­‐confusion,	  but	  at	   the	   cost	   of	   increasing	   joint-­‐myopia.	   Aligning	   mental	   models	   promote	   agents’	  tendency	   to	   concentrate	   on	   that	   portion	   of	   the	   landscape	   that	   is	   perceived	   as	   jointly	  attractive,	  while	  ignoring	  the	  need	  to	  broadly	  explore	  the	  search	  space.	  	  We	  argue	  that	  significant	  organizational	  phenomena	  call	   for	   the	  need	  to	   jointly	  consider	  the	  search	  for	  solutions	  by	  individuals	  with	  diverse	  knowledge	  (i.e.,	  a	  specialist	  activity)	   and	   achieving	   coordination	   between	   these	   interdependent	   searchers.	   Our	  novel	   contribution	   is	   to	   extend	   prior	   theory	   on	   organizational	   search	   to	   include	  problems	   of	   coordinated	   exploration	   and	   understand	   the	   mechanisms	   by	   which	  problems	  of	  coordinated	  exploration	  differ	  from	  unitary	  search.	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The	   novel	  mechanisms	   explicated	   in	   this	   study	   throw	   some	   light	   on	   resolving	  long-­‐standing	   empirical	   contradictions	   as	  well	   as	   offer	   some	   novel	   predictions.	   Some	  empirical	   work	   in	   NPD	   suggests	   that	   high	   levels	   of	   communication	   improve	  innovativeness	  in	  NPD	  performance	  whereas	  other	  studies	  suggest	  the	  opposite	  (Brown	  and	  Eisenhardt,	  1995;	  Krishnan	  and	  Ulrich,	  2001;	  Tyre	  and	  Hauptman,	  1992;	  Montoya-­‐Weiss	  and	  Calantone,	  1994).	  This	  contingency	  effect	  is	  theoretically	  ill	  understood.	  	  We	  offer	  novel	  predictions	  by	   suggesting	   a	   contingency	  when	   this	   relationship	  between	   communication	   volume	   and	   innovation	   performance	   is	   true.	   Our	   simulation	  results	  suggest	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  communication	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  task	  environment.	  The	  more	  the	   landscape	  emphasizes	  search	  over	  coordination,	   the	  more	  detrimental	  the	  effects	  of	  too	  much	  communication.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  more	  the	  landscape	  emphasizes	  coordination	  over	  search,	   the	  greater	  the	  need	  for	  communication.	  Future	  empirical	   research	   should	   take	   into	   account	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   problem	   space	   when	  determining	   the	   impact	   of	   organizational	   mechanisms	   that	   promote	   high	   levels	   of	  interaction,	  such	  as	  cross-­‐functional	  teams,	  on	  NPD	  performance.	  	  Our	  simulation	  model	  also	  suggests	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  communication	  volume	  on	  innovation	  performance	  depends	  on	  the	  initial	  knowledge	  held	  by	  the	  agents.	  The	  more	  knowledgeable	  the	  specialist	  agents	  in	  their	  own	  domains,	  the	  lesser	  the	  need	  for	  search	  and	  the	  more	  the	  joint	  search	  problem	  resembles	  a	  coordination	  problem.	  Under	  these	  conditions,	  more	  communication	  should	  have	  a	  beneficial	  effect.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  more	   “deep	   specialists”	   communicate,	   the	   greater	   the	   likelihood	  of	   achieving	   a	  highly	  innovative	   outcome,	   whereas	   the	   reverse	   should	   hold	   true	   for	   “shallow	   specialists”.	  Fleming	  (2007)	  from	  an	  analysis	  of	  patent	  data	  suggests	  precisely	  such	  a	  relationship.	  Future	  empirical	  work	  could	  test	  this	  relationship	  in	  other	  contexts.	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Our	   results	   may	   also	   have	   interesting	   implications	   for	   the	   organization	   of	  innovation.	  Srikanth	  and	  Puranam	  (2013)	  argue	   that	  higher	   levels	  of	  common	  ground	  are	  found	  within	  firm	  boundaries	  than	  across	  them.	  Coupled	  with	  the	  findings	  from	  this	  study,	  this	  suggests	  that	  alliances	  or	  other	  ‘market’	  based	  organizations	  may	  be	  a	  more	  effective	  way	  to	  organize	  innovations	  that	  require	  significant	  levels	  of	  search,	  whereas	  organization	   under	   hierarchy	   and	   tight	   communication	   may	   be	   more	   effective	   for	  innovations	  that	  require	  high	  levels	  of	  coordination.	  Understanding	  these	  relationships	  could	  be	  an	  interesting	  avenue	  for	  future	  work.	  	  Despite	  a	  “family	  resemblance”	  the	  mechanism	  we	  identify	  is	  distinct	  from	  “slow	  learning”	   in	   typical	   exploration-­‐exploitation	  models	   involving	   unitary	   agents	   (Denrell	  and	  March,	   2001;	  Knudsen	  and	  Levinthal,	   2007;	   Fang	   and	  Levinthal,	   2009).	  The	   slow	  learning	  result	  is	  achieved	  typically	  by	  weakening	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  agent	  actions	  to	  its	  performance	   consequences.	   In	   our	   model,	   however,	   this	   strategy	   leads	   to	   poor	  outcomes	   because	   of	   mutual-­‐confusion.	   We	   also	   find	   that	   reducing	   communication	  improves	   performance	   by	   reducing	   joint-­‐myopia,	   though	   only	   in	   landscapes	   that	  require	   exploration.	   Unlike	   prior	   work	   (Lounamaa	   and	   March,	   1989;	   Puranam	   and	  Swamy,	  2011),	  our	  result	  is	  not	  achieved	  by	  reducing	  agents’	  sensitivity	  to	  payoffs,	  but	  come	   about	   because	   search	   precedes	   coordination.	   It	   is	   here	   interesting	   to	   note	   that	  Lazer	  and	  Friedman	  (2007)	  in	  a	  model	  of	  network	  search	  (based	  on	  the	  NK	  framework)	  reached	  a	  similar	  conclusion	  as	  we	  did	  with	  respect	  to	  frequency	  of	  communication.	  In	  their	  model,	  actors	  would	  mimic	  other	  successful	  actors,	  and	  when	  there	  was	  no	  one	  to	  mimic,	   they	  would	   attempt	   to	   adapt	   their	   status	   quo	   configuration.	   Their	   core	   result	  was	   that	   systems	   with	   higher	   levels	   of	   connectivity	   and	   communication	   frequency	  would	  perform	  better	  in	  the	  short	  run,	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  long-­‐run	  performance.	  	  While	  we	   reach	   a	   similar	   conclusion	   regarding	   communication	   frequency,	   the	   underlying	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mechanism	  is	  very	  different.	  In	  Lazer	  and	  Friedman's	  (2007)	  model,	  actors	  could	  learn	  from	   each	   other	   about	   what	   does	   and	   does	   not	   work,	   but	   their	   payoffs	   were	  independent,	   i.e.	   it	  was	  a	  pure	  search	  model	  without	  the	  need	  to	  coordinate	  actions	  in	  the	   face	   of	   epistemic	   interdependence.	   In	   contrast,	   our	   model	   captures	   not	   just	   the	  evolution	  of	  mental	  models,	  but	  also	   their	  convergence	   in	  a	  coordination	  process,	  and	  its	   impact	   on	   subsequent	   exploration.	   Typical	   slow	   learning	   models	   do	   not	   capture	  these	  dynamics.	  	  The	  contrast	  with	  slow	  learning	  models	  does	  pose	  the	  question	  why	  the	  agents	  are	   unable	   to	   acquire	   more	   information	   and	   then	   use	   this	   information	   in	   a	  sensible/optimal	  way	   to	   guide	  both	   exploration	   and	   coordination.	  The	   answer	   to	   this	  question	   lies	   in	   the	  assumptions	  we	  make.	  These	   include	  (1)	  Agents	   initially	  have	   few	  partitions,	   i.e.	   they	   initially	  have	   little	   (or	  no)	  understanding	  of	   the	   task	  environment.	  (2)	  Agents	  have	   limited	  overlap	   in	   their	  partitions,	   i.e.	   they	  see	   the	  search	  space	   from	  different	   positions.	   (3)	  Agents	   have	  no	   common	  knowledge,	   i.e.	   even	  when	   they	  have	  overlapping	  partitions,	  they	  do	  not	  know	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case.	  (4)	  Agents	  act	  in	  parallel	  –	  there	  is	  no	  principal-­‐agent	  relationship	  so	  that	  one	  agent	  can	  explicitly	  guide	  the	  other,	  and	  (5)	  agents	  do	  not	  know	  what	  the	  optimal	  payoff	  is.	  	  To	  use	  information	  to	  optimize	  both	  exploration	  and	  coordination,	  one	  or	  more	  of	  these	  assumptions	  must	  be	  lifted.	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  agents	  faced	  a	  task	  environment	  with	   known	   maximum	   payoff,	   they	   could	   simply	   use	   this	   information	   to	   define	   a	  sensible	  stopping	  point	  (not	  necessarily	  the	  global	  maximum).	  As	  our	  robustness	  results	  show,	   if	   the	  agents	  have	  very	  high	   levels	  of	   initial	   knowledge	  about	   the	   search	   space,	  coordination	   concerns	   outweigh	   exploration	   concerns,	   and	   this	   trade-­‐off	   can	   be	  managed.	   However,	   this	   “explore,	   then	   coordinate”	   approach	   can	   be	   fairly	   time	  consuming,	   potentially	   expensive	   (some	   experiments	   are	   fairly	   expensive	   to	   conduct)	  
	   43	  
and	  perhaps	  inconclusive	  (what	  is	  a	  very	  high	  level	  of	  knowledge	  in	  the	  real	  world	  and	  where	  did	  it	  come	  from?).	  	  If	   agents	   had	   common	   knowledge	   regarding	   their	   knowledge	   partitions,	   they	  perhaps	  could	  keep	  taking	  samples	  from	  the	  wider	  space	  to	  see	  if	  some	  distant	  points	  were	   superior.	   Our	   results	   suggest	   that	   exploration	   with	   overlapping	   knowledge	  partitions,	   but	  without	   common	  knowledge	   leads	  only	   to	  mutual-­‐confusion.	  However,	  establishing	   such	   common	   knowledge	   in	   effect	   implies	   the	   lack	   of	   specialization.	   One	  way	   to	  prevent	   this	  may	  be	   if	   the	  agents	  established	  a	  principal-­‐agent	   relationship	  or	  established	  rules	  for	  sequential	  search;	  for	  example	  see	  Selten	  and	  Warglien	  (2007).	  We	  have	   not	   further	   examined	   this	   option	   because	   it	   would	   dramatically	   increase	   the	  configuration	  space	  of	  the	  model.	  This	  is	  an	  excellent	  avenue	  for	  future	  research.	  	  A	   related	   question	   is	   whether	   hierarchy	   can	   simply	   solve	   these	   coordination	  problems.	  We	  investigated	  the	  top-­‐down	  condition,	  where	  a	  superior	  directs	  search	  by	  aligning	   mental	   models	   upfront,	   which	   only	   has	   limited	   impact	   on	   improving	  performance.	  This	  is	  because	  in	  order	  to	  effectively	  coordinate,	  the	  hierarchy	  needs	  to	  be	   informed	   either	   of	   the	   location	   of	   the	   global	   peak	   before-­‐hand	   or	   of	   the	   emergent	  knowledge	  (new	  partitions)	  of	  both	  the	  specialists.	  The	  first	  condition	  implies	  search	  is	  largely	  unnecessary.	  The	  second	  puts	  extreme	  demands	  on	  the	  coordination	  capacity	  of	  the	   organization;	   it	   is	   perhaps	   easier	   to	   inform	   the	   other	   specialist	   directly	   than	   to	  inform	   the	   supervisor	   who	   then	   in	   turn	   directs	   search	   efforts.	   Therefore,	   hierarchy	  cannot	  simply	  solve	  problems	  of	  coordinated	  exploration,	  for	  the	  simple	  reason	  that	  the	  specialist	  agents	  have	  much	  more	   immediate	  knowledge	  than	  the	  supervisor,	  and	  this	  knowledge	   is	   difficult	   to	   transmit.	   Hierarchy	   could	   potentially	   have	   a	   role	   in	   solving	  these	  problems	  by	  sequencing,	  either	  of	  actions	  or	  by	  appointing	  agents	  with	  different	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skills	  at	  different	  stages	  of	  the	  problem.	  Examining	  these	  options	  are	  good	  avenues	  for	  future	  research.	  	  	  
Limitations:	  This	  work	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  following	  limitations.	  First,	  the	  landscape	  of	  innovation	  is	  exogenous	  to	  the	  model.	  Since	  organization	  of	  joint	  search	  is	  contingent	  on	  the	  type	  of	  innovation	  landscape,	  how	  does	  a	  manager	  know	  what	  type	  of	  landscape	  she	  is	  searching	  in?	  We	  do	  not	  address	  this	  –	  but	  prior	  work	  on	  belief	  formation	  may	  be	  helpful	   here	   such	   as	   the	   work	   on	   analogical	   reasoning	   (Gavetti	   and	   Rivkin,	   2007).	  Second,	   we	   have	   assumed	   that	   agents	   can	   switch	   seamlessly	   from	   any	   corner	   of	   the	  landscape	  to	  any	  other,	  which	  may	  not	  be	  feasible	   for	  reasons	  of	   limited	  rationality.	  A	  related	   problem	   is	   that	   knowledge	   of	   the	   agent	   sequentially	   increases	   –	   there	   is	   no	  forgetting	   in	   this	   model.	   Third,	   we	   have	   not	   systematically	   modeled	   performance	   of	  agents	  with	  asymmetric	  abilities.	  More	  interestingly,	  we	  have	  not	  explored	  sequencing	  –	  such	   as	   first	   searching	  with	   generalists,	   then	  with	   specialists;	   or	   coordinating	   by	   one	  type	   first	  and	  then	  by	  the	  other	   type.	  This	   is	   interesting	   future	  work.	  Fourth,	  we	  have	  not	  modeled	  hierarchy,	  which	  may	  be	  an	  important	  mechanism	  to	  align	  mental	  models	  or	  direct	  search	  without	  such	  alignment.	  Our	  top-­‐down	  form	  of	  coordination	  is	  related,	  but	   can	   be	   extended.	   As	   a	   final	   limitation,	   our	   analysis	   is	   focused	   on	   joint	   search	  involving	  two	  specialists.	  There	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  including	  more	  dimensions	  would	   alter	   the	   results,	   though	   the	   analysis	   would	   be	   more	   complicated.	   Future	  research	  could	  examine	  whether	  the	  dynamics	  we	  identify	  remain	  unaltered	  for	  higher	  dimensional	  problems.	  	  
Contributions:	   Despite	   these	   limitations,	   we	   believe	   our	   model	   makes	   some	  important	  contributions.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  first	  efforts	  to	  model	  search	  by	  considering	  both	   cognition	  and	  organization	   (of	  multiple	   agents)	   and	   their	   joint	   impact	  on	   search	  outcomes.	   It	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   understand	   the	   role	   of	   epistemic	   interdependence	   on	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search	  without	  modeling	  agent	  cognition.	  We	  show	  that	  joint	  search	  is	  not	  scaling	  up	  of	  individual	   search,	   but	   is	   qualitatively	   different.	   By	   employing	   a	   richer	   modeling	  strategy,	  we	  are	  able	   to	  refine	  predictions	   from	  previous	   theory	  and	   illustrate	  a	  novel	  mechanism	   –	   the	   tradeoff	   between	   mutual-­‐confusion	   and	   joint-­‐myopia	   –	   that	   makes	  joint	  search	  problems	  very	  different	  from	  individual	  search.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  our	  mechanism	   is	   robust	   to	   a	   number	   of	   checks	   –	   including	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   landscape	  (Rivkin	   and	   Siggelkow,	   2007),	   differences	   in	   initial	   cognition	   of	   the	   agents	   (Gavetti,	  2005),	   and	   to	   the	   specific	   assumptions	   of	   the	   search	   algorithm	   –	   surprise	   driven	   vs.	  payoff-­‐driven	   (March,	   1988;	   Simon,	   1962;	   Cohen	   and	   Axelrod,	   1982).	   As	   a	  methodological	  contribution,	  we	  also	  provide	  an	  alternative	  modeling	  platform	  where	  it	  is	   possible	   to	   understand	   the	   consequences	   of	   different	   kinds	   of	   common	   knowledge	  assumptions.	  Finally,	  our	  work	  has	  some	  very	  interesting	  implications	  for	  game	  theory.	  Prior	  games	  have	  either	  considered	  perfect	  information	  or	  imperfect	  information	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  payoffs	  to	  action	  choices	  are	  noisy.	  Our	  model	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  game	  whose	   structure	  unfolds	  with	   time.	  This	   feature	  of	   games	   is	   rather	  unexplored	  and	   is	  likely	   common	   in	   organizational	   situations.	   Future	   work	   in	   this	   area	   could	   be	   very	  interesting.	  	  
CONCLUSIONS	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  paper	  has	  been	  to	  examine	  problems	  of	  coordinated	  exploration.	  We	   introduce	   an	   analytical	   framework	   that	   can	   help	   differentiate	   coordinated	  exploration	   from	   individual	   search.	   Epistemic	   interdependence	   requires	   a	   trade-­‐off	  between	  search	  and	  coordination	  that	  is	  absent	  in	  unitary	  search.	  Too	  much	  exploration	  without	  aligning	  mental	  models	  leads	  to	  mutual-­‐confusion.	  Too	  much	  alignment	  stifles	  exploration	   by	   promoting	   joint-­‐myopia.	   We	   argue	   that	   predictions	   from	   models	   of	  unitary	   search	   likely	   lead	   to	   erroneous	   conclusions	  when	  applied	   to	   joint	   search,	   and	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explore	  how	  organizations	  can	  manage	  this	  trade-­‐off	  in	  joint	  search.	  In	  and	  of	  itself	  the	  consideration	  of	  richer	  forms	  of	  mental	  representations	  fills	  a	  void	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  organizational	   search	   and	   learning	   that	   inform	   our	   understanding	   of	   fundamental	  activities	  in	  firms	  such	  as	  joint	  problem	  solving.	  Our	  treatment	  is	  suggestive	  rather	  than	  exhaustive,	  but	  we	  hope	  that	  we	  have	  demonstrated	  why	  it	  is	  important	  to	  further	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  organization	  and	  joint	  search.	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Table	  1:	  Table	  of	  parameters	  	  Parameter	   Range	   Purpose	  Search	  landscape	   64	  x	  64	   The	  agents’	  task	  environment.	  This	  is	  the	  total	  number	  of	  possible	  combinations	  in	  which	  the	  agents	  search	  for	  innovations.	  In	  each	  dimension	  (Row,	  Column),	  there	  are	  64	  possible	  alternatives	  the	  agent	  can	  choose.*	  	  Initial	  Granularity	  (own	  dimension,	  other	  dimension)	   1	  x	  1;	  8x8	  2x1,	  4x1,	  8x1,	  16x1,	  24x1	  
The	  agents’	  information	  partitions	  at	  the	  start	  of	  search.	  The	  number	  of	  initial	  choices	  the	  agent	  sees	  in	  each	  domain	  can	  vary	  between	  1	  and	  64	  in	  each	  domain.	  	  Curiosity	  Parameter	  in	  switching	   τ:	  0	  –	  0.1	   The	  agents’	  propensity	  to	  engage	  in	  explorative	  activity.	  This	  governs	  the	  agent’s	  move	  between	  choices	  it	  is	  aware	  of.	  The	  movement	  is	  governed	  by	  a	  Softmax	  algorithm.	  The	  higher	  the	  parameter	  (τ),	  the	  more	  uncorrelated	  the	  actual	  movement	  of	  the	  agent	  with	  payoff	  differences.	  	  Communication	  frequency	  	  	   0	  –	  0.5	   Communication	  regulates	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  agents’	  knowledge	  partitions	  are	  aligned.	  For	  each	  dig	  attempt,	  this	  is	  the	  probability	  with	  which	  the	  row	  (column)	  agent	  receives	  new	  knowledge	  provided	  by	  the	  column	  (row)	  agent.	  When	  probability	  is	  zero,	  agents	  do	  not	  communicate.	  When	  probability	  is	  0.5,	  agents	  communicate	  approximately	  every	  other	  round.	  	  Propensity	  to	  partition	  in	  other	  dimension	   0	  –	  0.5	   The	  agent’s	  ability	  to	  bring	  forth	  new	  information	  in	  the	  complementary	  dimension.	  This	  the	  probability	  with	  which	  a	  row	  (column)	  agent’s	  dig	  attempt	  results	  in	  a	  partition	  in	  the	  search	  space	  in	  the	  column	  (row)	  dimension.	  	  	  *	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  do	  not	  vary	  the	  size	  of	  the	  search	  landscape.	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Table	  2	  –	  Impact	  of	  level	  of	  communication	  on	  performance.	  	  









	   	   	   	  
Coordination	   0	   0	   0.70	  
	   0	   0.05	   0.97	  
	   0	   0.10	   0.93	  
	   0	   0.50	   0.91	  	  	  
Table	  3	  –	  Unitary	  vs.	  joint	  search	  performance	  by	  specialists	  vs.	  agents	  with	  T-­‐
shaped	  skills.	  	  









	   	   	   	  
Unitary	  Search	   0	   0	   0.01	  
	   0.50	   0	   0.90	  
Autonomous	   0	   0	   0.70	  
	   0.50	   0	   0.60	  	  	  
Table	  4	  –	  Coordination	  by	  Hierarchy.	  	  









	   	   	   	  
Top	  Down	   0	   0	   0.85	  
	   0.50	   0	   0.85	  	  In	  all	  of	  the	  above	  results,	  the	  curiosity	  parameter	  τ	  =0.	  Initial	  granularity	  is	  set	  at	  1x1	  in	  all	  results	  except	  for	  the	  Top-­‐Down	  search	  regime,	  where	  it	  is	  set	  at	  8x8.	  For	  specialists,	  the	  propensity	  to	  partition	  in	  the	  other	  dimension	  is	  0;	  for	  agents	  with	  T-­‐Shaped	  skills	  it	  is	  0.50.	  Results	  obtained	  at	  T=	  500.	  Reported	  results	  are	  averages	  obtained	  from	  300	  runs	  for	  each	  condition.	  Reported	  differences	  are	  statistically	  significant	  at	  conventional	  levels.	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FIGURE	  1:	  Task	  Environment	  –	  1/4th	  the	  size	  of	  actual	  task	  environment	  	  The	  search	  space	  consists	  of	  a	  64x64	  matrix	  of	  possible	  materials	  and	  shapes	  from	  which	  the	  specialist	  searchers	  can	  choose	  from.	  Each	  combination	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  payoff	  value.	  In	  this	  example,	  only	  two	  combinations	  are	  associated	  with	  a	  positive	  payoff,	  with	  one	  of	  them	  being	  twice	  as	  valuable	  as	  the	  other.	  	  	  
	   54	  
	  
	  	  	  
FIGURE	  2:	  Baseline	  Search	  Algorithm	  	  
Initial	  Conditions:	  Agent	  is	  endowed	  with	  an	  initial	  mental	  model	  of	  the	  search	  space 
2.	  Sample	  from	  chosen	  sub-­‐space 
1.	  SWITCH	  to	  an	  attractive	  sub-­‐space	  given	  current	  knowledge 
3a.	  DIG	  in	  current	  sub-­‐space	  to	  understand	  it	  better	  (create	  new	  partitions	  in	  that	  sub-­‐space) 
4.	  Recalculate	  payoffs	  for	  all	  sub-­‐spaces	  currently	  visible 
3.	  Is	  current	  payoff	  in	  line	  with	  agent	  expectation?	   
No 
Yes	  (3b) 
Each	  sub-­‐space	  contains	  multiple	  latent	  combinations	  in	  reality.	  The	  agent	  is	  randomly	  placed	  in	  one	  of	  these	  combinations.	   
The	  choice	  set	  becomes	  progressively	  more	  fine-­‐grained	  as	  DIG	  continues.	  When	  finest	  level	  of	  granularity	  is	  achieved,	  further	  DIG	  attempts	  yield	  no	  new	  information. 
Payoffs	  recalculated	  in	  the	  subspace	  where	  new	  partition	  is	  revealed.	   






Figure	  3:	  Perfect	  vs.	  imperfect	  initial	  vision	  of	  task	  environment	  (1/4	  of	  actual	  
size)	  In	  perfect	  vision,	  all	  the	  16	  choices	  in	  the	  row	  and	  column	  dimension,	  and	  the	  256	  (16*16)	  associated	  payoffs	  are	  visible	  to	  the	  agents.	  In	  imperfect	  vision,	  the	  agents	  only	  see	  a	  3x2	  matrix	  instead	  of	  the	  16x16	  matrix.	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FIGURE	  4:	  Agent	  Vision	  and	  Switching	  Operation	  to	  more	  promising	  alternative	  
(1/4th	  of	  actual	  size)	  Agent	  initially	  sees	  a	  3x2	  search	  space	  with	  associated	  payoff	  for	  each	  sub-­‐space.	  Agent	  switches	  to	  the	  most	  promising	  alternative,	  depending	  on	  observed	  payoff	  (step	  1).	  Agent	  samples	  a	  specific	  combination	  (at	  random)	  in	  the	  chosen	  sub-­‐space	  (step	  2).	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FIGURE	  5:	  Dig	  Operation:	  New	  Information	  revealed	  to	  row	  agent	  A	  new	  knowledge	  partition	  occurs	  (step	  3a).	  The	  agent	  now	  sees	  four	  sub-­‐spaces	  (hardwood-­‐straight,	  hardwood-­‐curved,	  softwood-­‐straight,	  softwood-­‐curved),	  when	  earlier	  it	  perceived	  only	  two	  (wood-­‐straight,	  wood-­‐curved).	  The	  agent	  now	  calculates	  expected	  payoffs	  for	  each	  of	  these	  four	  sub-­‐spaces	  (step	  4).	  	  	  Note	  that	  when	  the	  column	  agent	  digs	  a	  new	  knowledge	  partition	  occurs	  in	  the	  column	  dimension.	  In	  figure	  4,	  both	  the	  row	  and	  column	  agent	  perceive	  a	  3x2	  matrix.	  After	  dig,	  the	  row	  agent	  perceives	  a	  4x2	  matrix	  (as	  above),	  the	  column	  agent	  would	  perceive	  a	  3x3	  matrix.	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Increase	  in	  Granularity	  with	  time	  	  
	  
Increase	  in	  Granularity	  with	  time	  
	  
Probability	  of	  Digging	  Deeper	  
	  
Probability	  of	  Digging	  Deeper	  	  
Figure	  6:	  Search	  by	  Specialist	  Agent	  in	  2-­‐Spike	  landscape	  –	  Impact	  of	  frequency	  of	  
communication	  on	  payoffs,	  granularity	  and	  dig	  probability.	  	  In	  all	  of	  the	  above	  results,	  curiosity	  parameter,	  τ	  =0;	  initial	  granularity	  is	  1x1;	  propensity	  to	  partition	  in	  other	  dimension	  is	  0.	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Figure	  7:	  Average	  position	  of	  agents	  in	  the	  2-­‐peaks	  landscape.	  	  In	  the	  above	  results,	  initial	  granularity	  is	  1x1,	  and	  curiosity	  parameter,	  τ	  =0.	  	  Results	  obtained	  at	  T=	  500.	  Figure	  represents	  average	  over	  300	  agents.	  	  
	  
PANEL	  A:	  	  Unitary	  Search;	  agent	  propensity	  to	  partition	  in	  other	  dimension	  =0.5.	  	  
PANEL	  B:	  	  Autonomous	  Joint	  Searchers	  	  Agent	  propensity	  to	  partition	  in	  other	  dimension	  =0;	  	  communication	  frequency	  =0.	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Figure	  8:	  Task	  environments	  (1/4	  of	  actual	  size)	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Appendix	  1	  –	  Model	  Mechanics	  	  This	   appendix	  provides	   the	  mathematical	  details	  of	   agent	  behavior	   in	  our	  model.	  The	  switch	  and	  dig	  operations	  of	  the	  agents	  are	  governed	  by	  the	  softmax	  algorithm.	  	  	  
Switch:	   The	   Softmax	   algorithm	   allows	   tuning	   of	   the	   agent’s	   propensity	   to	   apply	   the	  
switch	   from	   the	   current	   cell	   to	   another	   cell.	  More	   formally,	   according	   to	   the	   Softmax	  algorithm,	  the	  agents’	  probability	  of	  sampling	  a	  particular	  cell	  in	  the	  landscape	  i	  at	  time	  step	  t	  is	  dependent	  on	  that	  cell’s	  observed	  mean	  performance	   ix ,	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  mean	  performance	  across	  all	  perceived	  cells	  d.	  	  
	  	  This	   is	   the	   standard	   version	   of	   the	   Softmax	   algorithm	   (Luce,	   1959;	   Sutton	   &	   Barto,	  1998).	  The	   “temperature”	  τ	   (0<τ≤1)	   is	   the	  agent’s	   exploration	  parameter	  –	   the	  higher	  the	  τ,	  the	  more	  curious	  the	  agent	  is	  and	  the	  more	  likely	  that	  the	  agent	  switches	  among	  the	  known	  cells	  in	  a	  random	  manner	  (ignoring	  expected	  payoffs).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  Softmax	  algorithm	  operates	  on	  divisions	  of	  the	  search	  space	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  agent’s	  emergent	  mental	  maps	  (see	  Figures	  4	  and	  5	   for	  examples).	   If	  an	  agent	  holds	  a	  mental	   map	   as	   illustrated	   in	   Figure	   4,	   this	   agent	   perceives	   a	   total	   of	   d=8	   cells.	   The	  Softmax	  algorithm	  then	  computes	  the	  probability	  of	  locating	  in	  each	  of	  these	  eight	  cells	  and	  thereby	  switching	  from	  the	  current	  cell	  to	  a	  different	  portion	  of	  the	  search	  space.	  	  	  In	   each	   cell,	   the	   agent	   is	   positioned	   at	   a	   random	   combination.	   In	   consequence	   of	   not	  being	  able	  to	  see	  the	  latent	  combinations	  underlying	  a	  cell,	  the	  agent	  in	  effect	  performs	  a	  random	  walk	  among	  them	  –	  the	  probability	  distribution	  over	  each	  of	  the	  underlying	  positions	  in	  the	  reality	  matrix	  is	  uniform.	  The	  agents	  receive	  a	  payoff	  for	  the	  position	  in	  the	  reality	  matrix	  where	  they	  are	  actually	  situated.	  	  
	  
Dig:	   The	   probability	   of	   digging	   into	   a	   particular	   cell	   in	   the	   landscape	   i	   at	   time	   step	   t	  depends	   on	   the	   difference	   between	   that	   cells	   observed	  mean	   performance	   ix and	   the	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actual	  payoff	   ix received	  from	  the	  agent’s	  current	  the	  position	  in	  the	  reality	  matrix	  –	  and	  on	  the	  propensity	  λ	  to	  apply	  the	  dig	  operation:	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	   algorithm	   defines	   a	   probability	   distribution	   over	   differences	   between	  expected	   and	   actual	   performance.	   Higher	   values	   of	   λ	   makes	   the	   agent	   much	   more	  sensitive	  to	  deviations	   from	  expected	  performance,	  which	  results	   in	  application	  of	   the	  dig	   operation	   and	   an	   increase	   of	   granularity	   in	   the	   cell	   where	   the	   agent	   is	   currently	  active	  (see	  Figure	  5	  for	  an	  example).18	  	  	  We	  also	  performed	  a	   threshold-­‐driven	  dig	  operation	  as	  a	   robustness	   check	   instead	  of	  the	  above	  surprise-­‐driven	  formulation.	  This	  is	  given	  by	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  where	  ρ	   is	  the	  threshold	  payoff	  above	  which	  the	  agent	  stops	  searching,	  and	  the	  actual	  payoff	  received	  is	   ix .	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Based on extensive sensitivity tests, we chose actual values of λ in the interval [1,10] as shown in Table 1. A 
value of λ= 10 corresponds to a very high propensity to dig . By contrast, a value of λ= 1 corresponds to a rather 
low propensity to dig. Our main results are robust the value of λ. We report results for λ= 1.  
 
